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Chapter 1
Introduction
According to the recent book by Professor Alan S. Blinder ”The Quiet Revolution. Central
Banking Goes Modern” published in 2004 ”...one of the hallmarks of the quiet revolution
in central banking practice has apparently been a movement toward making decisions
by committee, whereas previously the dictatorial central bank governor was more the
norm...” (Blinder (2004), p. 35). To put this conclusion in numbers: a study carried out
by the Bank of England has shown that 79 out of 88 (that is 90%) central banks have
committees (Fry et al. (2000)).
The transition to collective decision making requires that central banking in general
and monetary policy in particular should be analyzed in a number of additional dimen-
sions. As interest rate decisions are no longer taken by a single individual, a number
of issues arise, related for example to an appropriate and efficient aggregation of diverse
preferences, diverse beliefs about models of the economy and likely future developments.
This puts yet another question to the validity of the "...traditional economic analysis
[that] takes the behavior of policy makers, in particular the behavior of monetary policy
makers, as exogenous..." (as argued earlier by Cukierman (1992), p. 1)
The behavior of policy makers has been traditionally analyzed by political economy.
According to Cukierman (1992), in the 1980s ’new political economy’ emerged, charac-
terized by the use of modern tools such as game theory and econometrics. The change
produced a number of highly influential ideas regarding the proper design of a monetary in-
stitution.1 One of the earlier proposals was to delegate monetary policy to an independent
1For a comprehensive review of monetary policy institutions, see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1999).
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and conservative central banker (Rogoff (1985)). Its impact cannot be underestimated:
according to Maxfield (1997), 34 countries have increased operational independence of
their central banks between 1989 and 1999, compared to only 3 such changes in the 1980s
(see also Cukierman (1998)). A more recent idea is assigning an explicit (inflation) target
to a central bank (Svensson (1997)). Such a target can be enforced in a number of ways,
from imposing certain transparency requirements to including a clause in the contract
offered to a central bank governor, which stipulates his dismissal in case the target should
be missed (as is the case in New Zealand). Explicit inflation targeting has become increas-
ingly popular over the 1990s: according to Fry et al. (2000) 6 out of 84 (7%) central banks
had inflation targets in 1990 and only 1 (New Zealand) had a sole inflation target, while
eight years later the proportion was 54 out of 94 (57%), with 11 sole inflation targeters.
The above solutions have been designed to improve policy outcomes by producing
the following two effects: (1) raising the cost of a deviation from the pre-announced
policy path: under rational expectations, public anticipation of such deviation produces
undesirable macroeconomic outcomes (’biases’), and, at the same time, (2) allowing for
a safe degree of ’constrained discretion’, which is necessary in the ever more complicated
world where all possible future states cannot be foreseen (see e.g. Fischer (1995) and King
(2004)). Still, successful as they are, these solutions stem from an analysis that is limited
to investigating interactions between one economic and one political party, and they do
not account for the fact that an economic party constitutes of a number of individuals.
It seems plausible to presume that political economy is entering yet another stage in
its development, dominated by an analysis of interactions between individuals comprising
an economic party, such as a monetary policy committee. The main contribution from
this stage could be a set of rules for a proper design of a committee, such that it would
foster the safe degree of ’constrained discretion’ which monetary institutions are supposed
to provide. Uncertainty characterizing our environment makes a committee inarguably
valuable as the means to aggregate necessarily diffuse expertise; instituting efficient pro-
cedures and decision rules for the committee makes it possible to obtain monetary policy
decisions which are superior in terms of accuracy to the ones taken by an individual.
There is already some evidence available on the superiority of collective decisions, in the
form of laboratory experiments. Blinder and Morgan (forthcoming) have tested two hy-
potheses in order to provide the reason behind the observed proliferation of collective
3decision making in monetary policy: (i) Are group decisions (on average) more accurate
than individual decisions? and (ii) Does the collective character of the process affect (read:
increase) the delay with which decisions are reached? The experiments have shown that
not only groups did make better decisions, they also did not require more data (and time)
to reach them. As a matter of fact, as experiment participants improved their knowledge
of the game they played, groups have become statistically significantly faster in reacting
to events.
Blinder and Morgan (forthcoming) have also touched on issues related to the design
of a committee: decision rules and deliberations. Their experiment has shown that "...
for whatever reason, majority decisions quickly evolved into unanimous decisions..." (p.
20). The authors have compared the results of experiments with theoretical predictions
from a number of models: the whole is equal to the average of its parts, the median voter
theory, and ’may the best man win’. None of them provided a satisfactory explanation:
the accuracy of group decisions exceeded both the average of individual scores and the
median score that would be obtained under pure simultaneous voting. Another experi-
ment, carried out at the Bank of England, provides other valuable insights into collective
decision making processes. Lombardelli et al. (2002) found that "...collective decision
making appears to give more weight to the better and less weight to the worse committee
members - as judged by their scores when playing the game as individuals..." (p. 7). For
this reason simple averaging of individual scores falls short of collective outcomes. The
authors have also documented "...evidence that committees do more than this, enabling
all members to improve their performance by sharing information and learning from each
other..." (p. 7).
The results summarized in the last paragraph teach us that "...not all committees are
created equal..." (Blinder (2004), p. 54). Hence, a particular design of the institution of a
monetary policy committee is likely to affect its performance and the quality of decisions
that it delivers. In chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis we will investigate the consequences
of committee structure and decision rules on the accuracy of its decisions and we will
provide recommendations regarding different procedures and possible trade-offs involved.
In particular, in chapter 2 we will discuss the most efficient design of a monetary policy
committee structure, such that it gives the appropriate attention to differences in indi-
vidual decision makers’ beliefs, information and skills. We will also show that attaching
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different weights to different opinions as well as following opinions of other committee
members may be perfectly rational, and, more importantly, quality-improving, choices.
In chapter 3 we will formally assess the effects of sharing and pooling diverse information
and expertise that the committee has at its disposal.
In the final chapter of this thesis we will look at another institutional aspect of mone-
tary policy making: we will investigate central bank control of short-term interest rates.
By focusing on the implementation of monetary policy decisions, this study nicely com-
plements the analysis presented in chapters 2 and 3.
In the last ten to fifteen years, monetary policy implementation has entered a new
stage: "...an approach which is new in its clarity, theoretical foundation, and acceptance by
almost all central banks..." (Bindseil (2005), pp. 234-235). The ’new view’ has broken up
with the tradition of controlling quantitative measures of money supply and put forward
a short-term interest rate as the appropriate operational target. This target has been
postulated to be universal and independent of the monetary strategy chosen by the central
bank. Moreover, the ’new view’ considers standing facilities, open market operations and
required reserves as the appropriate instruments for steering short-term interest rates.
The design of the operating framework has been and will be affected by innovations
in financial markets. However, the ’new view’ is likely to remain relatively robust to
some developments, for example to the possible disappearance of the demand for central
bank’s reserves. Woodford (2001), among others, argues that in such a case the ’corridor’
system set by official interest rates on central bank’s standing facilities will still remain
effective in steering the short-term interest rate towards the desired level. Within such
framework, central banks can still choose the mix of the level and characteristics of reserve
requirements, the type and frequency of open market operations and the width of the
corridor (Bindseil (2005)). Indeed, in chapter 4 we will show and analyze an example of
two largely different operating frameworks used by the European Central Bank and the
Federal Reserve which deliver comparable precision of interest rate control. The European
Central Bank has a symmetric wide corridor set by interest rates on standing facilities,
relatively large reserve requirements with averaging provisions and weekly open market
operations. The Federal Reserve operates under an asymmetric corridor (i.e. with only
one interest rate), no reserve requirements and daily open market operations.
This thesis consists of two connected parts, each contributing to our understanding of
5a particular institutional aspect of modern monetary policy making, where a committee
of policy makers decides on a short-term interest rate, and this decision is subsequently
implemented in the money market with the use of open market operations and other
instruments.
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Chapter 2
Hub-and-spokes monetary policy
committees
1
”...Improving the quality of decision-making by eliminating certain sources
of error that prevent a group from achieving its goals can be expected to have
good social consequences for policy-making groups that have good goals...”2
Most textbooks on monetary policy are based, either implicitly or explicitly, on the
assumption that policy decisions are taken by a homogenous entity, often denoted as ‘the’
central bank. However, in reality these decisions are the competence of a group of persons,
organized in the form of a committee. Prominent examples include the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System and the Governing Council of
the European Central Bank (ECB). As noted by, inter alia, Blinder (1998) and Chappell
et al. (2003), the fact that monetary decision-making is conducted by a committee could
have implications for the way policy is conducted. Blinder (2004) argues that individual
committee members might differ in their (voting) behavior due to differing preferences,
different models, different forecasts or different capabilities to process information.
In this paper we focus on issues stemming from the unavoidable heterogeneity among
committee members, in particular the heterogeneity in the accuracy with which they are
1This chapter is a version of a paper published as a DNB Working Paper, No. 27, January 2005,
co-authored by Jan Marc Berk.
2Janis (1982), p. 274
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able to correctly judge the prevailing (economic) conditions, and therefore their ability
to take the (ex ante) correct interest rate decision. Intuitively, one would like to have
more-skilled committee members to have a larger say in the collective decision. Indeed, it
can be shown (see Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997)) that a weighted voting rule is optimal
in terms of the quality of the collective decision. Although weighted voting rules can
be found in real life3, it is seldom found in monetary policy committees. This may be
due to the fact that it is politically infeasible (as it could be seen as running counter to
democratic principles), or difficult to implement in practice.
The main contribution of this paper is that we show that a certain institutional setup
of a committee is able to both retain the simple majority voting rule4 and to eliminate the
inefficient use of information implied by the fact that individual members have different
levels of expertise. We propose to divide the committee into two sub-groups according to
skills of members, allow the more-skilled group to meet prior to the actual policy meeting
and to produce a common position regarding the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
Subsequently, the two groups should jointly take a vote on interest rates. In addition
to an efficient use of the available information, our solution has additional advantages,
as it combines several prescriptions suggested by Janis (1982) to prevent a detrimental
concurrence-seeking group dynamics, labelled as groupthink. The relevance of our pro-
posal becomes clear once one looks at two of the most influential central banks in the
world, i.e. the Federal Reserve System in the US and the European System of Central
Banks in Europe (more specifically, in the euro area). Both central banks have two-tier
monetary policy committees, which is related to the structure of the corresponding central
bank, characterized by a main office in central location with additional regional offices
throughout the currency area. We label this as a ’hub-and-spokes’ system. As a con-
sequence, the FOMC consists of the members of the Board of Governors (’hub’) as well
as the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks (’spokes’). The Governing Council of the
European Central Bank includes members of the Executive Board of the ECB (’hub’) as
well as governors of all euro area national central banks (’spokes’). If, for whatever reason,
3Prominent examples include decision-making in the Council of the European Union and the presi-
dential elections in the United States. In both cases, votes are weighted according to size of the region
in question.
4Simple majority as we use throughout the text has 2 defining characteristics: the principle of one
person one vote, and the majority of 50% +1 votes is required to adopt a certain decision.
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members of the Board of Governors (ECB Executive Board) are in a better position to
identify the ’true’ state of the economy from the evidence presented than are other mem-
bers of the FOMC (Governing Council), our analysis indicates that the adopted structure
actually improves the quality of monetary policy.
In the literature on monetary policy, modelling central bank behavior bank has been
predominantly along the lines of Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985). Hefeker
(2003) and Sibert (2003) constitute recent examples of the shift in research attention
to the investigation of the behavior of individuals that together form a monetary policy
committee. These authors focus on the case in which committee members have common
abilities but different preferences, which may lead to different voting behavior, see also
von Hagen and Süppel (1994) and Grüner (1999). Our work by and large forms the
complement to this approach as we focus on the situation in which committee members
have common preferences but different abilities, and thus may vote differently. See in
this respect also the work of Gersbach and Hahn (2001a,b). Given this objective, we
also employ a different methodology and use models of collective decision-making under
uncertainty, as frequently used in the jury literature. In fact, to our knowledge, jury
models are as yet not frequently used in the analysis of monetary policy, which makes our
paper interesting from a methodological point as well. A prominent exception is a recent
paper by Persico (2004). Although related, this paper differs in terms of objective, i.e. it
focusses on the role of information gathering.
Section 2.1 below describes the basic model and illustrates the suboptimality of simple
majority voting in a monetary policy committee with heterogeneous members. Section 2.2
proposes an alternative institutional set-up, and explores the (rationality of the) voting
behavior of members in this alternative regime. Section 2.3 presents the consequences of
our alternative structure of the monetary policy committee for the quality of monetary
policy, and section 2.4 concludes. Proofs of propositions can be found in the appendix
(section 2.5).
2.1 Effects of a suboptimal decision rule
In a monetary policy committee, members are presented with evidence concerning the
state of the economy. Each member assesses the evidence, and on the basis of her in-
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terpretation votes either to change the policy interest rate or to leave it unchanged. In
deciding how to vote, each member has to consider the costs of changing interest rates
when the economy in fact requires leaving them unchanged, or of leaving the policy stance
unchanged when the economy in fact requires a change in rates. The committee member
must also consider the likely effect of her vote on the final outcome, which depends on the
votes of other members. Thus an answer to the question how a committee member will
vote requires considering the strategic interaction between committee members. Decision-
making in a monetary policy committee may therefore be modelled using Bayesian game
theory, see for example Osborne (2004) and Hirschleifer and Riley (1992).
Our setup is a modification of the seminal work of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) on juries.5 We investigate interest rate decision-making
by a monetary policy committee faced with uncertainty about the prevailing economic
conditions. We model this uncertainty by assuming that the economy can be in either
of two states of the world: in state a economic conditions require a change of the policy
rate (decision A), in state b the appropriate decision (labelled decision B) is to keep rates
unchanged. We furthermore follow the literature and assume that committee members
have identical prior beliefs regarding the appropriate monetary policy stance.6 Of course
this prior belief may and in general will be modified by the evidence on the state of the
economy presented in the meeting. We model the possibility that committee members
interpret the evidence differently by assuming that this interpretation represents a private
signal each member receives and that is imperfectly correlated with the true state of the
economy. The higher the quality of this interpretation, the larger the probability that the
member receives the correct signal, i.e. in favour of a change in interest rates (signal A)
in state a and in favour for unchanged rates (signal B) in state b:
Pi(si = A|a) = Pi(si = B|b) = qi
Pi(si = B|a) = Pi(si = A|b) = 1− qi
We label the qi as individual decisional skills.7 In terms of the reasons given by Blinder
(2004) for heterogeneity of committee members’ voting behavior, our skill differential can
5Persico (2004) is a comprehensive overview of the related literature.
6This assumption is formalised by symmetric priors: ∀i : Pi (a) = Pi (b) = 0.5. For an analysis of
heterogenous priors, see Li, Rosen and Suen (2001).
7We assume 0.5 < qi < 1. This restriction on individual decisional skills implies that forming a
committee to take the particular decision is useful. If qi = 0.5, then the decision could be taken by
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be interpreted as stemming from differences in the way information is processed. Suppose
furthermore that individual committee members can be ordered according to their skills
and be clustered into 2 non-overlapping subgroups. That is, the committee is comprised
of m more-skilled and n less-skilled members.8 In hub-and-spokes systems of central
banks such as in the US or the euro area, such a clustering might coincide with the
’institutional’ clustering of the center versus the regions. We will return to this issue later.
We furthermore assume that everybody knows in which group he or she falls, and also in
which group other committee members fall. The monetary policy committee convenes a
single time, and decides only on interest rates, via a simultaneous voting procedure. Also,
assume m is an even number and n is odd. In order to simplify the analysis, we fix m = 6
and analyze the effects of variations in n.9
Each committee member wishes to contribute to the appropriate monetary policy, i.e.
the interest rate setting that is called for by the state of the economy. Put differently, she
strictly prefers the two appropriate policy outcomes over the two bad ones. Moreover,
each member considers an inappropriate change in interest rates as bad as inappropriately
leaving the policy stance unchanged. These preferences are represented by the following
tossing a coin as many times as we have members. If qi = 1, then one individual would be sufficient to
take a perfectly correct decision. The assumption 0 < qi < 0.5 yields analogous results, except that the
actual decision should be the opposite to the one chosen by the committee. See also Ladha (1992).
8It has been shown (see Grofman et al. (1983)) that the accuracy of the collective decision taken
by a committee where individuals have heterogeneous decisional skills can be expressed in terms of the
average of their skill levels, q = 1n+m
Pn+m
i=1 qi, if individual skills qi are independently drawn from the
following (normal) distribution: qi ∼ N(q, q(1−q)m+n ).
The important assumption here is that the distribution of individual skills has second and higher
moments that are negligible. This results in a clustering of individual skill levels around the mean and
makes the approximation relatively accurate.
In our analysis we will use the subgroup averages, denoted by qM and qN respectively. Hence, our
approximation will by assumption be more accurate than the approximation of Grofman et al. using one
average skill level, since clustering of committee members into two non-overlapping sub-groups results
in the reduction of skill dispersion within the subgroups (relative to the skill variance in the whole
committee), i.e. σ2M < σ
2
i , σ
2
N < σ
2
i , where σ
2
i =
1
n+m
Pn+m
i=1 (qi − q)
2. Ordering results in the skill bias,
i.e. the difference in the average skill levels between the sub-groups: qM ≥ qN .
9m = 6 is chosen as it corresponds to the size of the ’hub’ in real-life examples. More specifically, the
Executive Board of the ECB has 6 members.
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Bernoulli payoffs for each committee member:10
ui (X|x) =



1 if X = B and x = b or if X = A and x = a
0 if X = A and x = b or if X = B and x = a
(2.1)
It is well-known (see e.g. Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997)) that, if committee mem-
bers have asymmetric skills (and there is no clustering of members into subgroups), the
optimal decision rule is weighted majority, with higher weights assigned to higher-skilled
individuals.11 Weighted majority maximizes the gains from aggregating individual het-
erogeneous expertise. However, in most real-life situations, and in particular in monetary
policy committees, votes are not weighted according to decisional skills. Instead, decisions
are taken by simple majority. It can be shown12 that under this voting rule it is rational
for the individual member to base her vote only on her interpretation of the evidence re-
garding the state of the economy, i.e. to vote informatively. However, despite maximizing
individual expected utility, informative voting is not enough to prevent the accuracy of
the collective decision from deteriorating under a suboptimal decision rule. This result is
illustrated in figure 2.1, which presents on the vertical axis the probability of an accurate
collective decision (interpreted as the quality of monetary policy and represented by the
conditional probability that the committee takes a correct decision) under both simple
majority13 (dotted lines) and the optimal rule, i.e. weighted majority14 (solid lines). The
10This utility specification implies that all committee members want to take the correct decision.
However, they may have different opinions on what actually is the correct decision, since they have
different information and skills. This specification, therefore, does not imply that they all prefer the
same interest rate.
11The weight should be calculated as wi = ln
³
qi
1−qi
´
.
12Because voting is simultaneous, the skill heterogeneity does not provide additional information for
individual members that is relevant for the collective decision. That is, we can use the results of Austin-
Smith and Banks (1996), derived under identical skills. The intuition behind their rationality proof is
straightforward: under a simple majority voting rule, an individual vote is pivotal (i.e. can change the
collective outcome) only when votes of other committee members are equally divided. Such a situation
does not provide any additional information about the state of the economy, and an individual is left to
trust his or her private information. That is, she will vote for A (B) if a signal to that effect is received.
See also Coughlan (2000).
13We can write the conditional probabilities as: PSM (B|b) = PSM (A|a) =
mP
sM=0
Ã¡m
sM
¢
qsMM (1− qM )
m−sM
nP
s=n+m+12 −sM
¡n
s
¢
qsN (1− qN )
n−sN
!
where SM denotes simple majority.
14That is, PFB(B|b) =
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Figure 2.1: Probability of an accurate interest rate decision under weighted and simple
majority
horizontal axis measures the skill bias, i.e. the differential between the average skill level
of the higher and the lower skilled group. We present 2 cases, depending on the size of
the less-skilled group, i.e. n = 3 (thin lines) and n = 13 (thicker lines).
Comparing the solid lines with the dotted ones, it can be seen that the loss in accuracy
of the collective decision can be quite substantial if the skills are very asymmetric within
the committee and/or if the lower-skilled group dominates the committee in size. In the
following section we will investigate possible solutions to this problem.
2.2 Individual voting behavior
Our main result, to be stated more precisely below, is that the above-mentioned informa-
tional inefficiency can be resolved by allowing the subgroup that is better in interpreting
the available economic evidence (i.e. the subgroup characterized by a higher average skill
level) to meet prior to the full committee meeting and allow them to take a collective
stand regarding the appropriate interest rate action. See Meyer (2004) for evidence that
mP
sM=0


¡m
sM
¢
qsMM (1− qM )
m−sM
nP
s=
o
1
2

n+wMwN (m−sM )
p
¡n
s
¢
qsN (1− qN )
n−s


= PFB(A|a), where wM = ln qM1−qM and wN = ln
qN
1−qN denote the optimal weights to be attributed to
the votes of more- and less-skilled individuals (see also proof to proposition 2.1 in the appendix). FB
refers to the first best decision rule, i.e. weighted majority.
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such a pre-committee meeting of a subgroup, in this case the Board of Governors, is rele-
vant for the US. We assume that both the subgroup and the full committee decide using
a simple majority voting rule,15 and that both decisions are made by a simultaneous vote.
We start by assuming that the common position of the subgroup (if any, see below) is not
disclosed prior to the vote in the full committee. We subsequently relax this assumption,
allowing for communication.
As the formal monetary policy decision has to be taken by the full committee, the
subgroup has the option to decide ’not to decide’. Given the size of this group, which
is even by assumption (6 to be exact), the meeting of the subgroup thus can generate
three outcomes. If there is a majority in favour of either A or B, this majority view
is adopted. If not, no prior position is adopted and the subgroup members will vote
individually in the full committee.16 We formalize the outcome of the subgroup meeting
in terms of probabilities that a certain alternative is selected, conditional on the available
information on the state of the economy. The three possible outcomes: (1) common
position for a correct decision (e.g. status quo in state b: P (CB|b)), (2) common position
for an incorrect decision (e.g. a change in interest rates in state b: P (CA|b)), and (3) no
common position (i.e. P (NC|b)).17 Formally, the probabilities are given by:
P (CB|b) = P (CA|a) = P
SM⊂M
sM≥m2 +1
Q
i∈SM
qi
Q
i/∈SM
(1− qi) (2.2)
P (CA|b) = P (CB|a) = P
SM⊂M
sM≥m2 +1
Q
i∈SM
(1− qi)
Q
i/∈SM
qi (2.3)
P (NC|b) = P (NC|a) = 1− P (CB|b)− P (CA|b) (2.4)
where the sums are taken over all subsets SM of the set M = {1, 2, 3, ...,m}, such that
sM (the number of members in SM) is at least m2 + 1. Under the assumptions made in
the previous section, we can write conditional probabilities of the subgroup taking either
15The assumption of simple majority voting in the full committee obviously is essential. The same does
not apply for the subgroup, we use the simple majority assumption mainly for reasons of simplicity.
16Meade and Sheets (forthcoming) present an interesting analysis of voting behaviour within monetary
policy committees of actual central banks, including dissenting behaviour.
17’CB’ stands for ’consensus for decision B’, ’CA’ for ’consensus for decision A’ and ’NC’ for ’no
consensus’.
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of the three actions as:
P (CB|b) = P (CA|a) =
mP
sM=
m
2
+1
¡m
sM
¢
qsMM (1− qM)
m−sM (2.5)
P (CA|b) = P (CB|a) =
mP
sM=
m
2
+1
¡m
sM
¢
qm−sMM (1− qM)
sM (2.6)
P (NC|b) = P (NC|a) = ¡mm
2
¢
q
m
2
M (1− qM)
m
2 (2.7)
The outcome of the subgroup meeting obviously has consequences for the number of
other committee members that have to be in favour of each policy alternative in order to
get it passed in the full committee. If opinions in the subgroup are divided, one half of the
subgroup members will vote for one alternative and the other half will vote against. If the
subgroup has a common position which in fact is the incorrect policy option, then the full
committee can still take the correct decision, if n+m+1
2
out of n less-skilled members vote
for it. If the subgroup has voted in favour of the correct alternative, then only n+m+1
2
−m
less-skilled committee members have to be of the same opinion and the correct decision
will be passed.
The quality of the monetary policy decision in our two-tier setup is then represented by
the conditional probability that the monetary policy committee takes the correct decision:
P (B|b) = P (B ∩ CB|b) + P (B ∩ CA|b) + P (B ∩NC|b) (2.8)
where:
P (B ∩ CB|b) = P (CB|b) P
S⊂N
s≥n+m+1
2
−m
Q
i∈S
qi
Q
i/∈S
(1− qi) (2.9)
P (B ∩ CA|b) = P (CA|b) P
S⊂N
s≥n+m+1
2
Q
i∈S
qi
Q
i/∈S
(1− qi) (2.10)
P (B ∩NC|b) = P (NC|b) P
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
Q
i∈S
qi
Q
i/∈S
(1− qi) (2.11)
S denotes subsets of the set N of less-skilled committee members, whose number s is
large enough to obtain the committee majority for the correct decision. All conditional
probabilities can be expressed using average decisional skills of each subgroup, qM and qN
analogously to formulas (2.5)-(2.7).
Equations (2.8)-(2.11) characterize the decision on interest rates by the monetary pol-
icy committee, assuming that individual members base their vote on their interpretation
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of the evidence on the state of the economy, i.e. that they vote informatively.18 The lemma
below indicates that this voting procedure possesses desirable equilibrium properties.
Lemma 2.1 Informative voting constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the two-tier voting
setup, provided that the interest rate decision is taken by simple majority.
Proof. See appendix.
2.3 Quality of collective monetary policy decisions
The two-stage voting procedure defined above effectively replaces the optimal weighted
voting rule as it reinforces the position of more-skilled committee members. This result
is stated in proposition 2.1 below.
Proposition 2.1 If individual decisional skills are highly heterogeneous, the two-stage
voting procedure described above perfectly approximates the accuracy of the collective deci-
sion that would be achieved in a committee dominated by the subgroup if a weighted voting
rule would be applied. The accuracy of the collective decision taken by a committee where
more-skilled members are in minority is also improved but not as much.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 2.2 illustrates proposition 2.1, using numerical assumptions identical to the ones
underlying figure 2.1. The figure again relates the quality of the collective decision (vertical
axis) to the average decisional skills of the less-skilled committee members (horizontal
axis). Dotted lines refer to simple majority without a two-tier setup, solid lines to weighted
majority, and dashed lines represent the quality of monetary policy formulated by a two-
tier committee. Thin lines represent a small committee (6+3 members) and thicker lines
a larger committee (6 + 13). The former is an illustration of a committee dominated by
the hub, and the latter illustrates a committee dominated by the spokes.
Creating a subgroup of more-skilled members improves the accuracy of the collective
decision; this two-tier structure works particularly well in a relatively small committee.
Consider the FOMC in the United States. This monetary policy committee, which is
18Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) provide a formal definition of informative voting. In our notation,
a voting strategy vi is informative if vi (si = A) = A and vi (si = B) = B.
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Figure 2.2: Probability of an accurate interest rate decision under weighted majority,
simple majority and two-stage voting
dominated (in terms of votes needed to secure a majority) by the Board, decides using a
simple majority rule. The graph shows that if Board-FOMC members are substantially
better in assessing the available evidence on the state of the economy, simple majority
without allowing the Board to meet prior to the FOMC meeting and to take a common
stand on interest rates, is far from optimal. The degree of inefficiency is measured by
the difference between the thin solid and dotted lines. This inefficiency is completely
eliminated once prior meeting is allowed (the thin solid and dashed lines overlap). For
larger committees, this inefficiency is reduced, but not eliminated. However, if we extend
the two-tier structure by allowing for communication prior to the decision in the full
committee, the quality of monetary policy again closely resembles the first best rule
(of weighted voting). By communication we mean that the higher-skilled members are
required to announce their common position (if they have reached one) before the interest
rate vote in the full committee. This announcement provides an additional common signal
to other committee members.
Proposition 2.2 If individual decisional skills are highly heterogeneous, communication
in a two-stage voting procedure increases the accuracy of the collective decision to be made
by a committee where more-skilled members are in minority so that it is as high as if a
weighted voting rule were applied. This is because communication changes the rational
behavior of committee members: the less-skilled individuals choose to follow the common
position of the more-skilled ones.
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Figure 2.3: Probability of an accurate interest rate decision under four decision-making
rules
Proof. See appendix.
Again we illustrate the results from proposition 2.2 graphically in figure 2.3: we re-
produce the lines from figure 2.2 drawn for the larger committee of 19 individuals and
introduce a solid gray line for the two-tier setup with communication stage.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the fact that communication yields the highest accuracy of the
collective decision for the lowest average skills of the less-skilled members. As we move
from left to right on the horizontal axis (the skill bias decreases) the optimal decision
procedure changes from two-tier voting with communication, through two-tier voting
without communication, to simple majority voting. The ECB Governing Council can
be taken as a real-life example of a larger committee, where the Executive Board is
in minority. The Governing Council currently decides by simple majority. Only when
Council members are nearly identical in terms of their ability to assess the true state of
the economy of the euro area correctly from the available evidence will this voting rule
imply the highest possible quality of the monetary policy decision. If it is the case that,
say, the members of the Executive Board of the ECB are on average better informed or for
some other reason are better skilled in identifying the true state of the economy, simple
majority in the Council results in suboptimal monetary policy decisions, as it implies an
inefficient use of information. The extent of this inefficiency depends on the size of the
’skill bias’, as does the solution for improving the quality of the monetary policy decision.
If governors of euro area national central banks on average are substantially worse in
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interpreting the evidence on the state of the economy in the euro area presented in the
Council meeting, it would pay to allow the Board to meet prior to the Council meeting to
discuss interest rates and to communicate the result of this meeting to the Council prior
to the decision on interest rates. If this skill bias is relatively small, it still pays to allow
the Board to meet prior to the Council meeting, but communication of the outcome of
this meeting should be discouraged. This is because the (opportunity) cost of following a
common position, i.e. giving up one’s own assessment of the economic situation, increases
as the skill advantage of the group that forms the common position decreases.
In any case, institutional amendments can overcome the inefficiency in the use of
information and restore the efficient bias towards the more-skilled committee members.
This, however, does not mean that delegating the decision to the more-skilled committee
members is desirable.
Proposition 2.3 Only when decisional skills of committee members are very unevenly
distributed (e.g. if qN ∼ 0.5) will delegation of monetary policy decisions to the more-
skilled members improve the quality of monetary policy. In all other cases, delegation
is most likely to yield worse results than a decision made by the full monetary policy
committee, either by simple majority or by two-stage voting.
Proof. See appendix.
Both propositions 2 and 3 have clear implications for monetary policy. They also
illustrate a fundamental result in the theory of information, due to Blackwell.19 Loosely
interpreted, Blackwell’s theorem states that ignoring information is detrimental. Take
proposition 2.3 as an example. Under our assumptions, the less-skilled members bring
valuable expertise to the full committee meeting (although it is relatively less valuable
than the knowledge of the more-skilled members), so ignoring it will in most cases imply
a less informed decision.
Our proposal thus approximates the infeasible optimal decision rule of weighted vot-
ing by reinforcing the position of the higher skilled MPC members. Furthermore, a word
of caution is necessary. Knowledge of the size of the skill bias is essential, if one were
to institutionally adjust the structure of the monetary policy committee composed of
19Blackwell (1951), (1953). See also Hirschleifer and Riley (1992) and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2003) for
recent expositions.
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heterogenous members as to achieve the best possible monetary policy decision. A mis-
judgment regarding the skill bias might lead to a committee structure that actually results
in a worse monetary policy outcome than the default of the committee taking the decision
by simple majority after a simultaneous vote. We can observe this clearly in figure 2.3:
for a skill bias smaller than 0.11 the dotted line is drawn above the dashed line, i.e. simple
majority yields higher accuracy in collective decision-making than the two-stage voting.
2.4 Discussion
The key idea underlying the analysis presented above is the suggestion of Blinder (2004)
that members of monetary policy committees might differ systematically in their abil-
ity to interpret the economic evidence presented to them in the committee meeting. In
hub-and-spokes central banks such as the FED or the ESCB, this may coincide with the
division between the hub and the spokes. The hub (i.e. the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the ECB Executive Board) is usually entrusted with the
preparation of the monetary policy discussions; for example, it prepares assessments of
current macroeconomic conditions and provides forecasts under alternative policy scenar-
ios. The execution of these tasks may require a knowledge base of the hub that is, on
average, higher than that of the spokes. In addition, it has been argued (see Hefeker
(2003)) that hub-and-spokes central banks, and corresponding monetary policy commit-
tees, reflect a political compromise between regions, which insist on representation, and
a board appointed by the central governing body. This may coincide with the hub be-
ing relatively oriented towards processing macro-economic information (i.e. regarding the
currency area as a whole), with the spokes bringing more micro-economically oriented
decision-making methods to the table. This is well-documented for the US. Presidents
of the Federal Reserve Banks (the spokes) are selected by the boards of these regional
banks, and (6 out of 9) of these board members are appointed by the regions themselves
and supposed to represent local (banking, industry, agriculture and commerce) interests
in mind, see Mayer (2001) and Chappell et al. (2005) for details.20 The thrust of this
20As Mayer (2001, p. 145) notes, there has been some discussion in the US relating to the fact that the
FOMC is seen as: ’... a committee that makes the key decisions on ... interest rates with almost half of its
members chosen by local boards of directors of whom two-thirds are bankers or bankers’ representatives.’
Meade and Sheets (forthcoming) analyse and confirm the importance of regional considerations for the
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argument is not so much that there is an informational asymmetry, but rather a difference
in information processing methods due to different ’mind sets’.21 Finally, note that our
set-up can be also applied to the situation in which one of the members has relatively
superior skills, in our terminology, m = 1. This can be interpreted as the situation in
which the committee has a chairman that dominates in terms of abilities, as some argue
is the case under the current FOMC chairman.
So, in our view one cannot dismiss a priori the possibility that the there is a skill
bias between members of the hub and the spokes in monetary policy committees similar
in structure to those in the US and the euro area.22 This paper indicates that, if such
a bias is indeed present and substantial in size, having a meeting of the full committee
that decides on monetary policy by simple majority will result in monetary policy that
is suboptimal. When implementing the optimal voting rule is either unwarranted (for
democratic or political reasons for example) or infeasible, our results indicate that it is
possible to restructure the committee in such a way that it generates monetary policy
outcomes that closely approximate the optimum.
However, the solution we propose is not without its dangers, i.e. the cure may actu-
ally be worse than the illness. This is especially true if there is substantial uncertainty
regarding the extent of the skill bias between the hub and the spokes. In combination
with the fact that hub-and-spokes systems of central banks tend to be motivated by more
reasons than the quality of policy, see for example von Hagen and Süppel (1994), and
Meade and Sheets (forthcoming), it may actually be preferable to strive for a maximal
dissemination of knowledge and information across the hub and the spokes, as to prevent
US case.
21Chappell et al. (1993, 1995) argue that the hub usually acts as liason between the currency area (the
US or the euro area) and the outside world, and thereby gets access to private information that makes it
better equipped to interpret the evidence on the state of the economy of the currency area. We find this
argument less convincing, as it seems unlikely that (given equal preferences of members) this information
is not shared in the meeting.
22Ultimately, the existence of a skill bias is an empirical question. Unfortunately, an empirical analysis
is impossible to do for the euro area, given the fact that minutes and/or voting records of the policy
meetings are not published. For the US, Chappell et al. (2005) find no evidence of difference in ’power’
of Governors and voting Federal Reserve Bank presidents. However, it is difficult to relate this to skill
differentials, as there is also evidence that such a bias in the US case would not show up in voting records,
as dissenting votes are seen as a revolt to the leadership of the chairman (Meyer (2004)).
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a skill bias from occurring.
We would like to conclude by stating that, while the main motivation of this research
is based on real life, i.e. the ’hub-and-spokes’ monetary policy committees of the Federal
Reserve and the European Central Bank, our analysis is highly stylized and contains some
important caveats. This should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. An example
of such a caveat is that our setup allows only for a limited and specific form of interaction
among members, reducing the scope for an exchange of arguments that would lead to a
change of position. As noted by others, see, for example, De Nederlandsche Bank (2000)
and Goodfriend (1999), this interaction, where a common vision on interest rates evolves
from an exchange of views based on economic analysis, is an important characteristic of
monetary policy decision making by real-life committees. Further research is warranted
on this topic, and we plan to take this up in the future.
2.5 Appendix. Proofs to propositions
Lemma 2.1 Informative voting constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the two-tier voting
setup, provided that the interest rate decision is taken by simple majority.
Proof. Each committee member i chooses a voting strategy that maximizes her expected
utility, calculated over all states of the world as well as the actions chosen by other
members (since they affect the collective outcome and therefore utility of i).23 The latter
complicates the analysis. In particular, there are two types of situations that may occur:
(1) votes of other committee members will be divided in such a way that one of the
alternatives will receive at least the required majority (in our case of simple majority:
n+m+1
2
or more votes), and (2) votes of other committee members will be divided in an
indecisive way (in our case: n+m−1
2
votes for decision A and n+m−1
2
for decision B). In
the former cases, the action (i.e. the vote) of individual i is immaterial for the collective
outcome and therefore for her expected utility (see equation 2.1). In the latter cases, the
vote of individual i changes the collective outcome (i.e. is pivotal)24 and therefore affects
directly her utility from the collective decision. This implies that an utility maximizing
committee member i will restrict her voting strategy to the cases when her vote matters.
23See Osbourne (2004) for a further discussion of Bayesian games.
24Formally, a vote vi is pivotal if P (A) = 1⇔ vi = A and P (B) = 1⇔ vi = B, where P (A) (P (B))
denotes the probability that the committee will take decision A (B).
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The optimal voting strategy of a rational committee member is to vote for the alternative
that is more likely to be correct, based on her information set.25 The latter consists
of her own signal and the information deduced from the fact that her vote is pivotal.26
Informative voting constitutes a rational choice if the following conditions are met:27
Pi∈N (b|si = B, pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (2.12)
Pi∈N (a|si = A, pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (2.13)
where
Pi∈N (b|si = B, pivotal) = Pi(b)qiPi∈N (pivotal|b)Pi(b)qiPi∈N (pivotal|b)+Pi(a)(1−qi)Pi∈N (pivotal|a) (2.14)
Pi∈N (a|si = A, pivotal) = Pi(a)qiPi∈N (pivotal|a)Pi(a)qiPi∈N (pivotal|a)+Pi(b)(1−qi)Pi∈N (pivotal|b) (2.15)
Informative voting constitutes a Nash equilibrium if the conditions (2.12)-(2.13) hold
when the probabilities are evaluated under the assumption that all (other) committee
members vote informatively. This is shown formally below.
Analyzing the game backwards, we start with the choice facing a less-skilled member
when she is to cast a vote for or against a change in interest rates: her vote is pivotal
when the votes of other committee members are split: n+m−1
2
votes for a change and
n+m−1
2
votes against. Such a situation occurs in three cases (remember that m = 6 and
n is odd throughout), depending on the earlier decision of the more-skilled subgroup (see
25If we denote ri = P (b| i’s information set), then the expected utility from voting B is P (b) ri and
the expected utility from voting A is P (a) (1− ri). An individual will vote A if P (a) (1− ri) > P (b) ri,
or (given the assumption of P (a) = P (b) = 0.5), if ri < 0.5.
26The informational content of the fact that i is pivotal is determined by the voting rule. In the case
of simple majority, being pivotal does not provide additional information. This is not true for the case
of unanimity. Assuming that no change in interest rates is the default option and the change requires
unanimity, the only situation when an individual vote will be pivotal is when all other committee members
will have voted for a change in interest rates. In that case, and assuming that all other committee members
have voted informatively, state a is more likely to be true than state b and therefore option A is more
likely to be the correct decision.
27As discussed in the previous footnote, in the case of a unanimous voting rule these conditions are not
likely to be met. Pure considerations of a pivotal situation will lead committee member i to believe that
state a is more likely to be true and to vote for a change in interest rates, regardless of her own information.
In such a setup, informative voting is not a Nash equilibrium: the best response to informative voting
of other committee members is to vote uninformatively (!) For a more detailed analysis of the effects of
unanimous voting rules, see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi (2000).
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equations (2.8)-(2.11)): (1) if the more-skilled subgroup has taken the correct position
and the votes of the less-skilled members are split n+m−1
2
− m for the correct decision
and n+m−1
2
against, (2) if the more.-skilled members have taken the incorrect decision and
the less-skilled members are split: n+m−1
2
voting for the correct decision and n+m−1
2
−m
against, and (3) if the more-skilled subgroup has not taken any common position and
the less-skilled members are also split: n−1
2
voting for the correct decision and n−1
2
voting
incorrectly. Hence the probability of being pivotal if all other members vote informatively
is given by:
Pi∈N (pivotal|b) = P (CB|b)
¡ n−1
n+m−1
2
−m
¢ ³
q
n+m−1
2
−m
N (1− qN)
n+m−1
2
´
+P (CA|b)¡ n−1n+m−1
2
¢ ³
q
n+m−1
2
N (1− qN)
n+m−1
2
−m
´
+P (NC|b)¡n−1n−1
2
¢
q
n−1
2
N (1− qN)
n−1
2 (2.16)
Since the decision rules both in the subgroup and in the full committee are symmetric,
the probability of being pivotal if all other members vote informatively is the same in both
states of the world:
Pi∈N (pivotal|b) = Pi∈N (pivotal|a) = Pi∈N (pivotal)
Given this result and our assumption about the priors, we arrive at the following
simplification of conditions (2.12)-(2.13):
Pi∈N (b|Bsi =,pivotal) = Pi∈N (a|si = A,pivotal) = qi∈N (2.17)
By assumption qi∈N ≥ 0.5 and therefore the optimal strategy for any less-skilled
member is to vote informatively if all other committee members are assumed to vote
informatively as well.
We now turn to the choices of the relatively higher skilled members. Under our
assumptions, an individual subgroup member’s vote is pivotal for the interest rate decision
to be taken in the full committee in m cases. In these cases, her vote makes the difference
between adopting a common group position or not, while the votes of other committee
members are split in such a way that a common position of the subgroup wins if it
is adopted and the other alternative wins if no common position is adopted.28 This
28Alternatively, a subgroup member that has the swing vote in the subgroup can be pivotal in the full
committee as due to her swing vote, the outcome of the vote in the full committee changes.
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requires the following combination of votes: m
2
votes for B in the more-skilled group and
between n−1
2
and n−m+1
2
votes (thus m
2
possible cases) for B among less-skilled committee
members29 or (symmetrically) m
2
votes for A in the more-skilled group and between n−1
2
and n−m+1
2
votes (again m
2
cases) for A among other committee members. The table below
illustrates this for a 6-person subgroup where a member is pivotal for the final decision
(to be taken by simple majority n+7
2
):30
Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 3 2
1 Other members n−1
2
n+1
2
i votes B n−1
2
+ 6 = n+11
2
n+1
2
i votes A n−1
2
+ 3 = n−5
2
n+1
2
+ 3 = n+7
2
2 Other members n−3
2
n+3
2
i votes B n−3
2
+ 6 = n+9
2
n+3
2
i votes A n−3
2
+ 3 = n+3
2
n+3
2
+ 3 = n+9
2
3 Other members n−5
2
n+5
2
i votes B n−5
2
+ 6 = n+7
2
n+5
2
i votes A n−5
2
+ 3 = n−1
2
n+5
2
+ 3 = n+11
2
29That implies m2 −1 votes for A in the sub-group and between
n+1
2 and
n+m−1
2 among other committee
members.
30The squares highlight the winning majority. It is therefore easy to see, that depending on i voting A
or B, the winning alternative changes (i.e. i is indeed pivotal).
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Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 2 3
4 Other members n+1
2
n−1
2
i votes B n+1
2
+ 3 = n+7
2
n−1
2
+ 3 = n+5
2
i votes A n+1
2
n−1
2
+ 6 = n+11
2
5 Other members n+3
2
n−3
2
i votes B n+3
2
+ 3 = n+9
2
n−3
2
+ 3 = n+3
2
i votes A n+3
2
n−3
2
+ 6 = n+9
2
6 Other members n+5
2
n−5
2
i votes B n+5
2
+ 3 = n+11
2
n−5
2
+ 3 = n−1
2
i votes A n+5
2
n−5
2
+ 6 = n+7
2
The corresponding probabilities that a member of the more-skilled subgroup is pivotal
for the interest rate decision are:
Pi∈M (pivotal|a) =
µ
m− 1
m
2
¶
(1− qM)
m
2 q
m
2
−1
M
n−1
2X
s=n−m+1
2
µ
n
s
¶
qsN (1− qN)
n−s
+
µ
m− 1
m
2
− 1
¶
(1− qM)
m
2
−1 q
m
2
M
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2X
s=n+1
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µ
n
s
¶
qsN (1− qN)
n−s (2.18)
and
Pi∈M (pivotal|b) =
µ
m− 1
m
2
¶
q
m
2
M (1− qM)
m
2
−1
n−1
2X
s=n−m+1
2
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n
s
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s
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2
− 1
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q
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2X
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2
µ
n
s
¶
qn−sN (1− qN)
s (2.19)
Since
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¢
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2
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s
¢
qsN (1− qN)
n−s =
Pn+m−1
2
s=n+1
2
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s
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qn−sN (1− qN)
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n−s =
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2
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s
¢
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s, again we have the result:
Pi∈M (pivotal|a) = Pi∈M (pivotal|b) = Pi∈M (pivotal) (2.20)
and
Pi∈M (b|si = B,pivotal) = Pi∈M (a|si = A, pivotal) = qi∈M (2.21)
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Since qi∈M ≥ 0.5, informative voting is rational for all more-skilled committee mem-
bers, just as it is rational for all less-skilled committee members. It is therefore also
rational for the more-skilled members to stick to the common position formed in their
prior meeting (if one is formed) in the full committee vote. Hence, informative voting
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in this two-tier voting setup, provided that the interest
rate decision is taken by simple majority.
Proposition 2.1 If individual decisional skills are highly heterogeneous, the two-stage
voting procedure described above perfectly approximates the accuracy of the collective deci-
sion that would be achieved in a committee dominated by the subgroup if a weighted voting
rule would be applied. The accuracy of the collective decision taken by a committee where
more-skilled members are in minority is also improved but not as much.
Proof. The weights applied under the weighted voting rule are given as: wi = ln
³
qi
1−qi
´
.
It can be shown that the weight based on the average skill level is a good approximation
of the average weight of votes of the members belonging to one of the sub-groups within
the committee:
Ei∈M [wi] = Ei∈M
h
ln
³
qi
1−qi
´i
= Ei∈M
·
ln
µ
qi
qM
qM
¶
− ln
µ
1− qi
1− qM
(1− qM)
¶¸
= Ei∈M
·
ln
µ
qi
qM
¶
+ ln (qM)− ln
µ
1− qi
1− qM
¶
− ln (1− qM)
¸
= Ei∈M
·
ln
µ
1 +
qi
qM
− 1
¶
+ ln (qM)− ln
µ
1 +
1− qi
1− qM
− 1
¶
− ln (1− qM)
¸
' Ei∈M
·
qi
qM
− 1 + ln (qM)−
µ
1− qi
1− qM
− 1
¶
− ln (1− qM)
¸
= ln
³
qM
1−qM
´
+Ei∈M
·
qi
qM
− 1−
µ
1− qi
1− qM
− 1
¶¸
= ln
³
qM
1−qM
´
Analogously:
Ei∈M [wi] = Ei∈N
h
ln
³
qi
1−qi
´i
' ln
³
qN
1−qN
´
Therefore the votes of more-skilled committee members can be weighted with the
uniform weight of wM = ln
³
qM
1−qM
´
and the votes of less-skilled members with the weight
wN = ln
³
qN
1−qN
´
.
If the skills of committee members are relatively homogeneous, then the weights con-
verge, i.e. wN −→ wM as qN → qM , and they can be normalized to unity. In this case
standard results obtained in the literature for symmetric skills hold, i.e. the first best
decision rule (FB) corresponds to simple majority (SM) and any modification to this rule
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results in inferior accuracy of the collective decision, i.e. PSM(B|b) = PFB(B|b) and
P (B|b) ≤ P SM(B|b).
The departure from the first best has the most pronounced effects on the voting
outcomes when qN converges to the lower bound of 0.5, i.e. qN ∼ 0.5 (see figure 2.1). In
this case votes of the less-skilled individuals should be ignored: wN = ln 0.51−0.5 = 0. As
a result the decisions should actually be taken by the subgroup of more-skilled members
regardless of its size relative to the committee majority (provided this subgroup reaches
consensus). The probability that the committee takes the correct decision is given by:
lim
qN→0.5
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mP
sM=
m
2
+1
¡m
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¢
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m
2
¢
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2
Simple majority decision rule on the other hand yields the following results:
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sM=0
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2
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s
¢
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!
whereas simple majority in our two-tier set-up yields:
lim
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m
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−1P
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If m > n − 1, i.e. if the subgroup dominates the committee, then n+m+1
2
> n and
n+m+1
2
−m ≤, and the above probability can be simplified to obtain:
lim
qN→0.5
m>n−1
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2
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However, if the group of relatively highly-skilled individuals forms a minority in the
committee, the accuracy achieved under both ’ordinary’ simple majority and simple ma-
jority in the two-tier set-up is inferior to the first best decision rule:
lim
qN→0.5
PFB(B|b)− lim
qN→0.5
PSM(B|b) =
= −
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and
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qN→0.5
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However, the two-tier procedure still yields results superior to simple majority:
lim
qN→0.5
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qN→0.5
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Proposition 2.2 If individual decisional skills are highly heterogeneous, communica-
tion in a two-stage voting procedure increases the accuracy of the collective decision to be
made by a committee where more-skilled members are in minority so that it is as high as if
a weighted voting rule were applied. This is because communication changes the rational
behavior of committee members: the less-skilled individuals choose to follow the common
position of the more-skilled ones.
Proof. If communicated prior to the vote in the full committee, the position on interest
rates taken by the subgroup implies an additional piece of (common) information about
the likely state of the economy for the less-skilled members. Voting behavior of these
individuals changes.
Knowing that the more-skilled members have agreed on option B and assuming that
other less-skilled individuals will vote informatively, a less-skilled individual will vote
informatively if and only if the following conditions are met (see the main text):
Pi∈N (b|si = B,CB, pivotal) ≥ 0.5
Pi∈N (a|si = A,CB, pivotal) ≥ 0.5
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where
Pi∈N (b|si = B,CB,pivotal) = qiP (CB|b)q
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The same conditions define the optimal strategy of a less-skilled individual in case the
consensual position is A, since the setup is symmetric, i.e. Pi∈N (b|si = B,CA,pivotal) =
Pi∈N (a|si = A,CB,pivotal) and Pi∈N (a|si = A,CA,pivotal) = Pi∈N (b|si = B,CB, pivotal).
In the case that no consensual position has been reached by the more-skilled members
and no announcement has been made, the results of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)
apply and the optimal strategy is to vote informatively.
The conditions for the optimality of informative voting in case the announcement has
been made can be solved to yield the following restrictions on the relationship between
average skill levels and sizes of the two subgroups (assuming qi ∼ qN):µ
qN
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Pm
sM=
m
2
+1
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¢
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m−sMPm
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m
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Obviously, these conditions are not necessarily simultaneously satisfied. First, for
qN ∼ 0.5, only the first condition will be satisfied, since lim
qN→0.5
³
qN
1−qN
´
= 1. Secondly,
if qN increases (and approaches qM),
³
qN
1−qN
´1−m
quickly explodes (as can be seen in the
figure below, where the expression
³
qN
1−qN
´x
is drawn as a function of qN and x) and it
becomes increasingly likely that the first constraint will be violated, while the second
inequality becomes easily satisfied.
We thus have shown, that informative voting when both private and common signals
are used by the less-skilled committee members is not likely to be Nash equilibrium behav-
ior. Nevertheless, this set-up has another equilibrium, where the less-skilled committee
members ignore their private information and follow the more skilled members. Under
this strategy a less-skilled individual is never pivotal; following the more-skilled members
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Figure 2.4:
trivially becomes her optimal voting strategy:
Pi∈N (b|CB, follow) = P (CB|b)P (CB|b)+P (CB|a) ≥ 0.5
Pi∈N (a|CB, follow) = P (CB|a)P (CB|a)+P (CB|b) ≤ 0.5
Although the optimal strategy of less-skilled members obviously changes in response
to the additional information, communication does not affect the strategy of more-skilled
members, i.e. their optimal choice still is to vote informatively. This is because an
individual board member’s vote is pivotal in the same (m) cases, when his vote makes
the difference between a common position or no common position in the subgroup and
the votes in the full committee are split in such a way that in the case of no consensus in
the subgroup the other alternative wins. In order to illustrate the fact that a more-skilled
individual is pivotal in exactly the same cases as when there is no communication, we
construct a table analogous to the one in the proof to lemma 2.1 with all cases when a
member of a 6-person subgroup is pivotal for the final decision when communication is
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involved:
Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 3 2
1 Other members n−1
2
n+1
2
i votes B n+ 6 0
i votes A n−5
2
n+7
2
2 Other members n−3
2
n+3
2
i votes B n+ 6 0
i votes A n+3
2
n+9
2
3 Other members n−5
2
n+5
2
i votes B n+ 6 0
i votes A n−1
2
n+11
2
Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 2 3
4 Other members n+1
2
n−1
2
i votes B n+7
2
n+5
2
i votes A 0 n+ 6
5 Other members n+3
2
n−3
2
i votes B n+9
2
n+3
2
i votes A 0 n+ 6
6 Other members n+5
2
n−5
2
i votes B n+11
2
n−1
2
i votes A 0 n+ 6
Comparison to the table in the proof to lemma 2.1 reveals that in all 6 cases the
votes of all committee members other than member i are split in exactly the same way
as when the communication stage is not included. As a result, the conclusions about
optimal voting strategy made in the proof to lemma 2.1 hold in the setup enlarged by
communication.
The equilibrium of the two-stage voting game with communication is: (1) informative
voting of the more-skilled members and (2) informative voting/following the more-skilled
members for the less-skilled individuals. Under this new equilibrium behavior, the prob-
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ability that the committee takes the correct decision is given by:
lim
qN→0.5
PCOM(B|b) =
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2
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Proposition 2.3 Only when decisional skills of committee members are very unevenly
distributed (e.g. if qN ∼ 0.5) will delegation of monetary policy decisions to the more-
skilled members improve the quality of monetary policy. In all other cases, delegation
is most likely to yield worse results than a decision made by the full monetary policy
committee, either by simple majority or by two-stage voting.
Proof. If the decision is delegated to the more skilled committee members, then its
accuracy is given by:
PD(B|b) =
mP
sM=
m
2
+1
¡m
sM
¢
qsMM (1− qM)
m−sM + 0.5
¡m
m
2
¢
(qM (1− qM))
m
2 (2.22)
The optimality of delegation relative to simple majority and two-tier voting rules
depends on the composition of the committee, specifically: on the average skill levels and
the relative sizes of the two subgroups. We analyze the problem in two cases: (1) the
more-skilled group dominates the committee (i.e. m ≥ n+m+1
2
, or m ≥ n+1) and (2) the
less-skilled committee members dominate (i.e. m ≤ n− 1).
Case 1: The simple majority and the two-tier voting procedures yield the following
accuracy of collective decisions:
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P (B|b)|m≥n+1 =
mP
sM=
m
2
+1
¡m
sM
¢
qsMM (1− qM)
m−sM
+
¡m
m
2
¢
(qM (1− qM))
m
2
nP
s=n+1
2
¡n
s
¢
qsN (1− qN)
n−s (2.24)
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The comparison of simple majority with delegation yields the following:
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The expression in the first line is always negative (since
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1 for qN < 1), while the expression in the second line is always nonnegative (since the
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Hence the results are not clear-cut:
P SM(B|b)|m≥n+1



≤ PD(B|b) if qN → 0.5
≥ PD(B|b) if qN → qM > 0.5
→ PD(B|b) if qM → 1
(2.26)
The comparison for the two-tier voting:
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Hence the following relations hold:
P (B|b)|m≥n+1



−→ PD(B|b) if qN → 0.5
> PD(B|b) if qN > 0.5
→ PD(B|b) if qM → 1
(2.28)
Case 2: For the simple majority voting rule we have:
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and
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where the first line is negative and the second - nonnegative. Hence we have similar result
as in the first case, except for the case qM ∼ 1:
P SM(B|b)|m≤n−1



≤ PD(B|b) if qN ∼ 0.5
≥ PD(B|b) if qN ∼ qM > 0.5
≤ PD(B|b) if qM ∼ 1
(2.31)
In the case of the two-tier voting procedure:
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(2.33)
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where the first difference is negative and the second - positive. Hence the following
relations hold:
P (B|b)|m≤n−1



≤ PD(B|b) if qN ∼ 0.5
≥ PD(B|b) if qN ∼ qM > 0.5
≤ PD(B|b) if qM ∼ 1
(2.34)
Comparing delegation to the first best decision-making rule, it is immediately obvious
that both procedures yield the same results iff qN ∼ 0.5 (see also the proof to proposition
2.1):
lim
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However, this is the only case when the two expressions are equal, since lim
qN→0.5
PFB(B|b)
consists the lower bound on the accuracy of the collective decision taken by the whole
committee under the first best decision rule:
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≥ 0⇒ PFB(B|b) > PD(B|b) if qN > 0.5 (2.36)
The nonnegative value of the derivative ∂P
FB(B|b)
∂qN
results from two interacting effects:
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Hence a rise in qN increases the size of the lower bound of the second sum, s, which makes
it more likely that each element of this sum, qsN (1− qN)
n−s, will increase due to a rise in
qN . The first best thus generally outperforms delegation.
Chapter 3
Communication in Monetary Policy
Committees
1
Most monetary policy decisions are nowadays taken by a group of individuals, orga-
nized in the form of a committee. This collective decision-making procedure might have
implications for the policy actually adopted. An approach that has been used in the
previous literature is to assume that members are identical in terms of decisional skills
but differ in preferences, thereby introducing strategic behavior, see inter alia von Hagen
and Süppel (1994), Hefeker (2003) and Sibert (2003). This paper follows a different route,
by assuming that members share preferences but differ in competence, for instance due
to informational differences. When members convene for the monetary policy commit-
tee (henceforth: MPC) meeting, they communicate and learn from each other, thereby
increasing their knowledge and decisional skills. This process of communication is an
important characteristic of real-life committee decision-making such as by the FOMC in
the US or the ECB Governing Council in the euro area (Goodfriend (1999), De Neder-
landsche Bank (2000)). The contribution this paper makes, is that it provides an analysis
of the effects of interaction or communication in a MPC. As we argue below, our concept
of communication is richer than used in most of the existing literature. We are thereby
able to provide a theoretical rationale for some of the results found in the recent empirical
literature on MPC’s, such as Gerlach-Kristen (2003a), Meade and Sheets (forthcoming)
1This chapter is a version of a paper co-authored by Jan Marc Berk.
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and Chappell et al. (2005).
The current paper builds on Berk and Bierut (2005), who study the suboptimality of
a simple majority voting rule for a MPC in which members’ skills are highly heteroge-
neous. It is well-known (see e.g. Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997)) that in this case the
optimal decision rule is weighted majority, as this voting rule maximizes the gains from
aggregating individual heterogeneous expertise. Using simple majority in such situations
yields inferior results in terms of the accuracy of the collective decision. However, we
found that by imposing minimal structure on the heterogeneity of members’ skills it was
possible to eliminate this suboptimality whilst retaining simple majority rule. This is to
be achieved by making certain institutional changes to the functioning of the monetary
policy committee. These changes implied allowing for prior meetings of a subgroup of
the monetary policy committee. This closely resembles the actual practice in real-life
monetary policy committees, in particular of those that are organized along federal lines,
such as the FOMC and the ECB Governing Council. Both committees consist of a hub
(Board of Governors and the ECB Executive Board, respectively) and spokes (regional
federal reserve banks and national central banks of members of the euro area). The cur-
rent paper adds substance to the communication between members of the monetary policy
committee.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start, in section 3.1, by describing the com-
munication and learning process in a committee. In section 3.2, we present our analytical
framework, which formalizes the effects of communication and learning at an individual
level. In this section, we also show how individual skills increase as a result of information
sharing. Next (section 3.3), we turn to an investigation of the effects of communication
and learning on the quality of collective decisions. We derive and compare the accuracy
of committee decisions reached under several decision-making scenarios, including the op-
timal decision-making rule, and for different committee members’ characteristics. Section
3.4 discusses the optimal size and decision time of the committee, under the assumption
that collective decision making entails costs. Section 3.5 concludes.
As in the case of simple decision-making rules which do not involve interaction among
committee members, the optimal decision-making rule in the case when committee mem-
bers communicate and learn from one another, but they have heterogeneous skills, also
involves weighting. We also show that implementing simpler decision-making rules, which
3.1. COMMUNICATION AND LEARNING 39
do not require weighting, can be used to approximate the optimal outcome. Depending
on the degree of heterogeneity of skills, the optimal decision making rule can be ap-
proximated by unweighted averaging of information shared by all committee members or
by limiting information sharing to a pre-meeting where only the more-skilled committee
members are present. The optimal size of a MPC that interacts is smaller than a MPC
that does not interact. An alternative interpretation of the latter result is that allowing
for communication is a cost-effective way of increasing the quality of monetary policy.
3.1 Communication and learning
In most of the existing literature on the effects of communication on collective decision-
making (see, for example, Coughlan (2000) Gerardi and Yariv (2003)), an exchange of
views has the form of members sending simultaneous messages regarding their preferred
outcome, which are then aggregated into a single recommendation for the collective de-
cision. The recommendation is binary and depends on the number of messages received
for each alternative. This setup merely aggregates existing knowledge, and therefore adds
very little - in terms of the quality of monetary policy - to a simple majority voting
rule. We argue that interaction of members of a MPC is more complicated than sending
simple yes-or-no messages to a certain ’aggregation device’. It involves a more extensive
exchange of views regarding the current and future state of the economy, the transmission
mechanism, etc. Communication thus implies an exchange of information that increases
the total knowledge available to the MPC. Put differently, it allows for the possibility that
the knowledge available to a MPC member just before the vote on interest rates is higher
than his initial level of skills, i.e. available to him when entering the MPC meeting. As
a result, communication improves the quality of the collective decision, made by simple
majority voting. Take the FOMC as an example: the meeting is composed of two rounds
of discussion: in the first round FOMC members share their insights on the economy (and
e.g. report the regional developments that have taken place), in the second, they vote on
the proposal for the interest rates (Chappell et al. (2005)).
Communication in a MPC involves an informative exchange of views regarding the
current and expected future state of the economy. Communication entails both speaking
and listening. That is, communication is informative in the sense that when some com-
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mittee member talks, other members listen and incorporate the received information into
their assessment of the state of the economy. We label this process as ’learning’. Learning
thus requires that at least one committee member speaks during the meeting. As soon
as at least one member speaks, all other members listen and learn. If nobody speaks,
nobody can listen and nobody can learn: each committee member then decides based
only on his own views. Before deciding on their vote, each committee member averages
all the information available to them (i.e. their own initial assessment and, when rele-
vant, the information that they obtained during the meeting).2 In the following section
we formalize this description.
3.2 Analytical framework
The model is based on Berk and Bierut (2005). Consider the case where interest rate
decisions are taken under uncertainty: the economy can be in either of two states of the
world: economic conditions are such that a change in policy rates is required (state a) or
not (state b). Committee members i = 1, . . . , n have to assess the state using available
information. They have identical prior beliefs regarding the appropriate monetary policy
stance. Of course this prior belief may and in general will be modified by the evidence
on the state of the economy presented in the meeting. We model the possibility that
committee members interpret the evidence differently by assuming that this interpretation
represents a private signal each member receives and that is imperfectly correlated with
the true state of the economy. The higher the quality of this interpretation, the larger
the probability that the member receives the correct signal. This translates directly into
a higher probability of making the correct individual decision, i.e. voting for a change in
interest rates in state a and voting for unchanged rates in state b:3
P (vi = A|a) = P (vi = B|b) = qi (3.1)
2See also Evans and Honkapohja (2001), sections 1.5 and 3.2.
3We assume that individual expertise qi ranges between 0.5 and 1. For a discussion of the assumption
of qi > 0.5, see Ladha (1992). Note that this assumption implies that each member receives enough but
incomplete information about the true state of the economy. If qi ≤ 0.5, the decision could be taken by
tossing a coin.
3.2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 41
and consequently:
P (vi = B|a) = P (vi = A|b) = 1− qi (3.2)
We label the qi’s as individual decisional skills. In line with earlier work (Berk and
Bierut (2005)) we impose some structure on the skill heterogeneity by assuming that it is
possible to cluster committee members into 2 subgroups such that the average skill level
between both groups differ. This assumption will simplify the calculations somewhat.
Skills are linked to the following, stylized description of the economy (see also Gerlach-
Kristen (2003b)). The evolution of inflation is captured by the following reduced-form
equation:
πt+1 = πt − αrt + et+1 (3.3)
where πt is the inflation rate at time t, rt is the real interest rate and et+1 is a normal
iid error. The central bank’s instrument - interest rate it - is related to inflation via the
Fisher equation:
rt = it − Etπt+1 (3.4)
Each committee member believes the model (3.3)-(3.4) to be true but has his/her
own idea about the strength of the transmission mechanism (αi) and has his/her own
forecast (expectations) of future disturbances to the inflation rate (Eiet+1). Individual
MPC members would like to set the following interest rate:
ii,t =
1
αi
(πt +Eiet+1) +
αi − 1
αi
π∗ (3.5)
where π∗ is the inflation target. The latter remains common to all MPC members.
An individual committee member i takes the correct interest rate decision when his/her
estimate of future inflation shocks is within a certain (close) range of the actual outcome.
Therefore we can define qi as the probability P (|Eiet+1 − et+1| ≤ x), where x is an arbi-
trarily chosen bound. A larger variance of the individual information about the state of
the economy (σ2i ) implies that the individual forecast (Eiet+1) is more likely to diverge
substantially from et+1. It thus lowers qi, the accuracy of the individual vote. Formally,
if individual forecasts are independent and accurate on average but differ in their uncer-
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Figure 3.1: Graphical interpretation of individual decisional skills
tainty: Eiet+1 ∼ IIN (et+1, σ2i ), then:
qi (x, σi) = P (|Eiet+1 − et+1| ≤ x)
= P (−x ≤ Eiet+1 − et+1 ≤ x)
= P
µ
− x
σi
≤ Eiet+1 − et+1
σi
≤ x
σi
¶
= Z (x/σi)− Z (−x/σi)
=
1√
2π
Z x/σi
−x/σi
e−
z2
2 dz (3.6)
where Z (.) denotes the standard normal CDF. Hence:
∂qi (x, σi)
∂σi
≤ 0 (3.7)
Figure 3.1 illustrates this, for x = 1. Individual skills qi (1, σi) are measured by the
size of the symmetric area under the standard normal DF (z (z; 0, 1)) between two vertical
lines cutting through the points z = {1/σi,−1/σi}. The thin lines in the figure define the
area of 50%: qi (1, σi) = 0.5, while the thick lines define the area of 80%: qi (1, σi) = 0.8.
The thin lines correspond to σi = 1.4826, the thick lines to σi = 0.78027.
Figure 3.2 presents the relation between the probability that the error made by an
individual committee member in assessing the state of economy does not exceed the
bound of unity (i.e. qi (1, σi)), as a function of the uncertainty of individual forecast,
σi.4 The figure illustrates that the relation between qi (σi) and σi is functional, i.e. it
4The size of the bound, x, is arbitrary. However, it does define the magnitude of the variances of
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Figure 3.2: Relation between individual decisional skills and the uncertainty of
individual forecast of future inflation shocks
is a one-to-one correspondence. Hence qi (σi) is invertible and σi is uniquely defined as
q−1i (1).
Without communication, a MPC using simple majority rule will adopt the median
interest rate, that is:
im,t =Median
µ
1
αi
(πt +Eiet+1) +
1− αi
αi
π∗
¶
(3.8)
If committee members communicate about the likely developments in the economy and
the transmission mechanism, voting will aggregate their views into the following interest
rate: eim,t =Medianµ 1eαi
³
πt + eEiet+1´+ 1− eαieαi π∗
¶
(3.9)
where tilda denotes the elements, which committee members update with the information
provided by their colleagues in the meeting. If eαi 6= αi and eEiet+1 6= Ei,tet+1, then interest
rate eim,t 6= im,t. This illustrates the difference between our concept of communication as
opposed to the one commonly used in the (jury) literature. In the latter, committee
members communicate their preferred interest rate ii,t only. In our case, they would
communicate Eiet+1 and (possibly) αi. This means that MPC members in our framework
not only communicate their preferred interest rate with their colleagues, but also share
their knowledge regarding future shocks to inflation and the strength of the monetary
transmission mechanism.
individual forecast errors, since qi (x, σi) is fixed between 0.5 and 1. For the sake of simplicity we will use
x = 1 throughout and denote the skills as qi (σi).
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If we for simplicity abstract from uncertainty related to the transmission mechanism
from the central bank’s instrument to the inflation rate, the problem of deciding on the
appropriate interest rate is similar to trying to obtain the best estimate of the mean
of an unknown distribution (et+1) from the sample of m + n observations. As is well
known from statistics, the best estimator of et+1 is the average of all the observations,
and larger samples will tend to give more accurate estimates than smaller samples. The
results in Gerlach-Kristen (2003b) reflect these considerations. Sharing the information
allows committee members to improve the accuracy of their estimates and therefore to be
able to take a better decision. Communication in MPCs implies aggregation of individual
(independent) assessments of the future risks to inflation. As a consequence, the variance
of the aggregated estimate of the future inflation risks should have a lower variance, i.e.
higher accuracy, than individual observations.
Communication is the combination of speaking and listening. But not everyone has to
speak, some committee members may just listen. Still, someone must speak so that others
have something to listen to. Hence, having at least one committee member speaking in
the meeting is necessary for learning. Formally, we model communication as ’cheap-talk’,
meaning that the contents of speech do not enter the payoffs of the speakers. Still, since
all committee members are interested in obtaining the best estimate of future inflation,
this gives them incentives to share their information (see e.g. Crawford and Sobel (1982)
or Austen-Smith (1990)). That is, it is rational for members to want to speak and to
speak the truth. The following illustrates the improvement in the decision skills due to
learning. Each more-skilled committee member gets 1 unit of time allocated to speak,
listening occurs instantaneous as speaking occurs, there are t time units available for
communication (=speaking and listening), and none of the less-skilled members speak. If
every more-skilled committee member incorporates the information obtained by listening
to his/her colleagues into his/her original estimation of the future inflation disturbance,
the updated estimate ( eEi∈Met+1) becomes:5
5One could imagine that the forecasts could be aggregated in the form of a weighted average, i.e. those
forecasts that are less uncertain (i.e. have lower σ2i ) should have a higher weight in the average eEiet+1.
Although this is the first-best approach (see Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997)), we abstract here from these
issues, as they are very difficult to put into practice for political reasons (see Berk and Bierut (2005) for
details).
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eEi∈Met+1 = 1t+ 1
Ã
tX
j=1,j 6=i
Ej∈Met+1 +Ei∈Met+1
!
(3.10)
eEi∈Met+1 ∼ N µet+1, σ2Mt+ 1
¶
if individual i ∈M does not speak (but he learns as others speak), and
eEi∈Met+1 = 1t
Ã
t−1X
j=1,j 6=i
Ej∈M,tet+1 +Ei∈M,tet+1
!
(3.11)
eEi∈Met+1 ∼ N µet+1, σ2Mt
¶
if individual i ∈ M does speak. The statistical behavior of the updated estimates can
be determined using the assumptions made earlier with respect to individual forecasts
Eiet+1 ∼ IIN (et+1, σ2i ).
The less-skilled committee members listen to their more-skilled colleagues and update
their forecasts of the future inflation shock in the following way:
eEi∈Net+1 = 1t+ 1
Ã
tX
j=1
Ej∈M,tet+1 +Ei∈N,tet+1
!
(3.12)
eEi∈Net+1 ∼ N µet+1, tσ2M + σ2N
(t+ 1)2
¶
As a result, the average decisional skills of both sub-groups of committee members
increase. Put differently, final skills (i.e. the level after the exchange of views, just before
the vote on interest rates) are larger than initial skills:6
(m+ 1)σ2M
m (t+ 1)
≤ σ2M : qM
³
σM
q
m+1
m(t+1)
´
≥ qM (σM) (3.13)
tσ2M + σ
2
N
(t+ 1)2
≤ σ2N : qN
µ√
tσ2M+σ
2
N
t+1
¶
≥ qN (σN) (3.14)
Figure 3.3 depicts the development of the average decisional skills of two subgroups,
more- and less-skilled committee members, as a function of time available for communi-
cation. As before, we assume that only more skilled members speak. But all committee
6If not all more-skilled members are able to speak (i.e. if t < m), the average uncertainty in their
inflation-disturbance forecasts is given as:
t∗σ
2
M
t +(m−t)
σ2M
t+1
m =
m+1
m(t+1)σ
2
M . If all more-skilled members
could share their knowledge, then they would come to a common idea about the future disturbances to
inflation with the average uncertainty of 1mσ
2
M .
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Figure 3.3: Learning curves for committee members
members hear the interventions. As a result, all committee members incorporate the
new information into their forecasts, and the average decisional skills of both subgroups
increase. This process is similar to the learning curves found in psychology, where a sub-
ject’s rate of learning is very rapid at first and subsequently slows down, see e.g. Goldstein
et al. (1993). The solid line represents the learning curve of the more-skilled members,
the dotted one the learning curve of the less-skilled members. The initial average skill
levels are fixed at qM (σM) = 0.8 and qN (σN) = 0.6. Note that, after all more-skilled
members have spoken, at the end of the time allotted for interventions, they all must
have formed the same forecast of the future inflation disturbance. This is not the case
for the less-skilled members. Notwithstanding the fact that their skills increase due to
their listening to colleagues, their initial assessments of the state of the economy differ
and remain private.
Figure 3.3 also illustrates two learning effects, documented by experimental evidence
(Lombardelli et al. (2002)): (1) the catching-up effect, i.e. the fact that the less-skilled
committee members update their knowledge learning from their more-skilled colleagues
and, as a result, average skill levels converge (although not necessarily perfectly: if the time
available is, for whatever reason, limited, then average skills may still differ substantially
when the committee moves to voting on interest rates); (2) knowledge creation: learning
is not limited to members with relatively low skills, as during communication the more-
skilled committee members also update their forecasts of future developments and increase
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their expertise.7
3.3 Quality of collective interest rate decisions
We now turn to the implications of communication for the quality of monetary policy,
where the latter is represented by the conditional probability that the committee makes
the correct decision on interest rates. Throughout the analysis, we assume that the
committee decides using a simple majority voting rule. We allow for the possibility of a
subgroup of the full MPC to meet prior to the vote on interest rates. As mentioned in the
introduction, this is likely to occur in hub-and-spokes monetary policy committees like
the FOMC in the US and the ECB Governing Council in the euro area. Berk and Bierut
(2005) argue furthermore that the division betweenmore-skilled and less-skilled committee
members coincides with the division between the hub (US Federal Reserve Board and the
ECB Executive Board) and the spokes (regional Federal Reserve Banks and National
Central Banks). The outcome of the prior meeting may or may not be announced to the
other members of the MPC prior to the interest rate decision. For simplicity, we assume
that during communication either all members of a subgroup speak, or none of them
does so. This gives us four possible situations: (i) nobody speaks; (ii) only more-skilled
members speak; (iii) only less-skilled members speak; (iv) all members speak. Assuming
that the total time available for communication is scarce so that it is not possible for all
members to hold interventions, it is intuitive to let the more-skilled members speak first.
For this reason, we do not consider case (iii).
The table below lists the cases we consider.
7Learning shows as an increase in the average accuracy of individual decision-makers with the number
of (monetary policy) games played (see Chart 3 in (Lombardelli et al. (2002))). Catching-up effect shows
in the fact that the initially worst decision-makers improve their scores relatively the most; knowledge
creation shows as an increase in the scores of the best players (Chart 4).
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Case Meeting More-skilled members Less-skilled members
1
Prior meeting
MPC meeting
—
no talk
—
no talk
2
Prior meeting
MPC meeting
—
talk and learn
—
talk and learn
3
Prior meeting
MPC meeting
no talk
announcement
—
no talk
4
Prior meeting
MPC meeting
talk and learn
announcement
—
no talk
5
Prior meeting
MPC meeting
no talk
no talk
—
no talk
6
Prior meeting
MPC meeting
talk and learn
no talk
—
no talk
We subsequently group the above cases, depending on the extent of communication
and learning:
1. no communication (the maximum of cases 1, 3 and 5)
This corresponds to the cases studied in Berk and Bierut (2005). They show that
the accuracy of the interest rate decision achieved under the optimal but infeasible
decision rule, i.e. weighted majority voting, can be approximated in the whole space
of combinations of average decisional skills of more- and less- skilled individuals (i.e.
qM (σM)×qN (σN)) by using a simple majority voting rule and splitting the MPC in
two sub-groups. Depending on the difference in the skill levels and the relative size
of the subgroups, the more-skilled subgroup should (i) convene prior to the MPC
meeting, vote on a common position and then announce it in the MPC meeting
(case 3), (ii) convene, vote, but not reveal their common position (case 5), and
(iii) not convene prior to the MPC meeting (case 1). Note that case 4 includes a
simple exchange of information in the form of an announcement. We however do
not classify this as communication, because it is inherently unidirectional. When
investigating the effects of communication on the quality of the collective decision,
we will use the maximum of cases 1, 4 and 6 to represent the ’no communication
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case’, i.e. the maximum achievable accuracy across the three scenarios under the
particular combination of the average skill levels (qM (σM) and qN (σN)).
2. learning limited to the prior meeting by the more-skilled committee members (the
maximum of cases 4 and 6)
In these cases, the more-skilled committee members form a common view on the
future shocks to inflation. But this common view is now based on an exchange
of views between each other. That is, all members present at the prior meeting
participate in the discussion by talking and listening to each other. After having
arrived at the common position, they may before the vote in the full MPC announce
this common position (case 4) or not (case 6), depending on whether or not it will
increase the accuracy of the MPC decision. Again we use the maximum of both
cases for comparison purposes.
3. learning in the full MPC meeting, when all committee members learn (case 2)
Communication can involve all MPCmembers talking, provided there is enough time
for all members to hold interventions and share their insights. In this case they form
a common idea about the future risks to inflation. The collective (updated) forecast
is a simple (unweighted) average of individual forecasts of all committee members:
eECet+1 = 1m+ n
m+nX
i=1
Ei∈(M∪N)et+1 (3.15)
eECet+1 ∼ N µet+1, mσ2M + nσ2N
(m+ n)2
¶
The probability that the committee will make the correct decision is given as
qC
µ√
mσ2M+nσ
2
N
m+n
¶
.
4. learning in the full MPC meeting, when all committee members learn (case 2)
Finally, we re-consider case 2, i.e. the case when there is no prior meeting of the
more-skilled committee members, and communication and learning takes place in
the MPC meeting, involving all members. However, now we assume that individual
information entering the common estimate of future inflation risks can be optimally
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weighted. As a result the collective forecast is given as:
eEwCet+1 = Pm+ni=1 wiEi∈(M∪N)et+1Pm+n
i=1 wi
(3.16)
eEwCet+1 ∼ N
Ã
et+1,
µ
1
nwN +mwM
¶2 ¡
nw2Nσ
2
N +mw
2
Mσ
2
M
¢!
(3.17)
where wN and wM denote the weights given to the individual estimates of the
less- and more-skilled committee members. The probability that the committee
will make the correct decision is in this case given as qC
µ√
nw2Nσ
2
N+mw
2
Mσ
2
M
nwN+mwM
¶
. The
determination of the optimal weights is explained in proposition 3.1 below.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the effects of communication on the accuracy of monetary
policy. The graphs plot the probability that the MPC takes the correct decision (P ) as
a function of the uncertainty surrounding the forecasts of future shocks to inflation made
by the less-skilled committee members (σN). Recall from figure 3.2, that the uncertainty
is inversely related to the individual decisional skills. The range of σN between 0.7803
and 1.4826 corresponds to qN (σN) between 0.8 and 0.5 (qM (σM) is fixed at 0.8). The
figures are drawn for two committee sizes: 9 and 19. In the first MPC, the more-skilled
sub-group of 6 members is in majority, in the second in minority. The latter case may
therefore be interpreted as relevant for the ECB Governing Council and the former as
relevant for the FOMC.
The solid and dashed lines represent the accuracy of the collective decision in the case
when all committee members have spoken. In the first case, individual information is
weighted optimally, in the latter - the information is not weighted. The dot-dashed line
relates to the situation in which a prior meeting occurs before the MPC meeting. During
the prior meeting the more-skilled individuals communicate and learn, and the outcome
may or may not be announced to the full MPC prior to its vote on interest rates (we
show the situation that gives the highest accuracy of the collective decision). Finally, the
dotted line represents the maximum achievable quality of the monetary policy decision in
all institutional set-ups without communication. In the small committee case, this line
is not shown, as it generated (for all values of qN (σN)) an accuracy far below the other
alternatives.
Figure 3.4 illustrates a trade-off involved in communication and learning: adopting
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Figure 3.4: Probability of an accurate interest rate decision taken by a small committee
with and without learning
the views expressed by others means to some extent giving up your own view.8 (Only) as
long as the latter is qualitatively less than the former, the collective outcome improves.
Figure 3.4 shows that allowing for learning across all members (dashed line) can imply a
worse collective outcome than limiting learning to the relatively higher-skilled committee
members (dot-dashed line). This is because in this board-dominated committee, allowing
for communication beyond the hub implies that the less-skilled sub-group influence the
final outcome. In case the knowledge differential is large, the latter will be less than in
the case where learning is limited to the board and only the more-skilled sub-group is
relevant for the final outcome.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the ’monotonically increasing’ benefits of communication for the
accuracy of collective decisions. By this we mean that the more members involved in
communication and learning, the higher the collective accuracy. The size of the com-
mittee is thus important for the sensitivity of the accuracy of collective decisions to the
extent of communication among committee members. In a small committee an inefficient
aggregation of a large amount of information, accumulated via sharing among all com-
mittee members, can lead to worse results than limiting communication and learning to a
sub-group of (highly-skilled) committee members. In a large committee composed of in-
dividuals with comparable, high, expertise, communication allows for a collective decision
that closely approaches the optimal accuracy. These results prove to be quite general.
8See also Swank and Wrasai (2002).
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Figure 3.5: Probability of an accurate interest rate decision taken by a large committee
with and without learning
Proposition 3.1 Assume that individual decisional skills are heterogeneous, i.e. qM (x, σM) >
qN (x, σN). The optimal decision making rule is information sharing among all committee
members, with the collective forecast being a weighted average of individual forecasts.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 3.2 Assume that individual decisional skills are heterogeneous, i.e. qN (x, σN) ∼
0.5 and qM (x, σM) > qN (x, σN). Depending on the size of the skill asymmetry, the op-
timal decision making rule could be approximated either by unweighted averaging of all
individual forecasts (for a relatively low asymmetry) or by limiting information sharing to
a pre-meeting by the more-skilled committee members (for a high skill asymmetry). Hence,
in case of a high skill asymmetry, the less-skilled committee members are redundant.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 3.3 If the skill asymmetry is very high, unweighted averaging of all indi-
vidual forecasts may yield even worse results than the decision making procedure which
excludes a communication stage.
Proof. See the appendix.
As in the case of simple decision-making rules which do not involve interaction among
committee members, the optimal decision-making rule (or procedure) in the case when
committee members communicate and learn from one another also involves weighting.
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The weights are positively related to the level of individual intrinsic skills. However, as
is the case with weighted voting, this optimal procedure does not have to be applied in
reality. Our analysis shows that implementing simpler decision-making rules, which do not
require weighting, approximates the optimal outcome for a particular set of parameters.
3.4 Optimal committee size
The upshot from the preceding analysis is that communication by and large is beneficial
for group decision-making. However, communication takes time, and extending the time
allotted to the committee to take a decision is costly. One can think of direct costs, in
terms of additional (travel) expenses, or of more indirect costs, such as changing appoint-
ments (with the press, for example) made earlier. We will return to the latter shortly.
The improvement of the collective outcome, i.e. of the vote on monetary policy, thus
does not come without a cost. Neither should we expect that individuals participate in
decision-making bodies for purely altruistic motives. Their participation usually involves
paying salaries. Therefore the total cost is related to the size of the committee as well
as the time it requires to take a decision. Since the decisional quality also depends on
both variables, we can calculate the optimal size and time allotted to communication of a
committee, given its structure (i.e. having a prior meeting with or without announcement
of its result), the initial level of skills and costs involved.
As before, the quality of the monetary policy decision will be measured by the con-
ditional probability that the committee takes the correct decision. The costs involved in
making this decision will be captured by the following function:
C(m+ n, t) = α (m+ n) + exp(βt)− 1 (3.18)
This form implies that the marginal cost of adding an extra committee member equals
α and is constant (see also Gradstein et al. (1990) or Nitzan and Paroush (1985)) and equal
for both more- and less-skilled committee members. The functional form is chosen for its
simplicity, whilst capturing the essentials. We for have experimented with alternatives
that allow more-skilled members to be more expensive.9 The results turned out to be
9Using the following cost function: C(m+n, t) = α (qMm+ qNn)+exp(βt)−1. It it is however unlikely
that paying a higher-skilled member a higher salary is politically feasible, using arguments similar to the
ones put forward against weighted voting in monetary policy committees.
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qualitatively similar to those reported below. Time costs are assumed to be nonlinear,
with the parameter β governing the costs of learning; this assumption can be motivated
by a real-life relevance.10 The meetings of the FOMC or the ECB Governing Council have
a more or less pre-announced duration. Then, if a meeting exceeds the pre-announced
deadline, economic agents may interpret this as a sign that the decision to be taken is a
contentious one - possibly an indication of a disagreement among the decision-makers. In
other words, financial markets may negatively interpret a longer-then-expected duration of
the meeting, and may even question the quality of the decision taken (thus the credibility
of the central bank is negatively affected). If one assumes that this type of effects is likely
to accumulate with the duration of the meeting, then the time-related costs should be
modelled in a nonlinear fashion.
The tables below present the optimal combinations of committee size m + n, time
available for learning t and the average initial skills of the less-skilled committee members,
together with the resulting accuracy of the collective decision and costs. The results are
calculated under the assumption that average initial skills of the more-skilled committee
members equals 0.8. We present 3 cases: no communication, learning limited to the
higher-skilled members (with communication only in a prior meeting), and the case in
which all MPC members learn without weighting. The first case applies our institutional
set-up to the existing jury literature. The third case builds on Gerlach-Kristen (2003b).
The second case is, to our knowledge, not yet dealt with. The table thus addresses the
following question: given the institutional set up, the average level of initial skills of
the more-skilled subgroup, what is the optimal size of the MPC, the time allowed for
10Remember that learning is only possible when members listen to others. This in turn requires that
other members speak. These interventions take time.
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communication11 and the optimal average level of skills of the less-skilled subgroup.
No learning Limited learning
α β Optimum Accuracy Cost Optimum Accuracy Cost
0.001 0.001
(0.8; 0.8)
17
0.997 0.017
(0.8;NA)
(6, 0)
0.998 0.012
0.001 0.01
(0.8; 0.8)
17
0.997 0.017
(NA; 0.8)
(0, 15)
0.996 0.015
0.01 0.001
(0.8; 0.8)
7
0.967 0.070
(0.8;NA)
(4, 0)
0.990 0.044
0.01 0.01
(0.8; 0.8)
7
0.967 0.070
(0.8;NA)
(4, 0)
0.990 0.081
0.1 0.001
(0.8; 0.8)
3
0.896 0.300
(0.8;NA)
(2, 0)
0.930 0.202
0.1 0.01
(0.8; 0.8)
3
0.896 0.300
(0.8;NA)
(2, 0)
0.930 0.220
11By assumption each intervention requires 1 unit of time. In the limited and unlimited learning case,
every member attending the prior meeting or the full MPC meeting talks and learns. The optimal learning
time thus is denoted by the optimal number of members (in the limited learning case: the optimal size
of m).
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Unlimited learning
α β Optimum Accuracy Cost
0.001 0.001
(0.8; 0.8)
5
0.996 0.010
0.001 0.01
(0.8; 0.8)
3
0.974 0.033
0.01 0.001
(0.8; 0.8)
5
0.996 0.045
0.01 0.01
(0.8; 0.8)
3
0.974 0.054
0.1 0.001
(0.8; 0.8)
3
0.974 0.330
0.1 0.01
(0.8; 0.8)
3
0.974 0.330
The numbers in the first row of the column ’optimum ’ reflect the average initial level
of skills of the more-skilled and the less-skilled subgroup, respectively. The numbers in
the second row of this column reflect the optimal size of the MPC, or, where relevant, the
optimal size of the more-skilled and less-skilled subgroup, respectively.
A first observation from the tables is that in the optimum, there is never a difference
in the level of skills of members. Even if we would make the participation of more-skilled
members slightly more expensive (see footnote 9), it always pays off to have as much high-
skilled members as possible. This result is due to a high non-linearity of the collective
accuracy with respect to individual initial skills. Unless the cost function would also be
highly nonlinear, the optimum will always yield a corner solution in terms of skill levels.
The no learning case gives the classic Condorcet result: if adding committee members
is (almost) costless, and given that the lower bound of skills exceeds 0.5, the optimal com-
mittee size becomes very large (unbounded). However, as soon as we relax Condorcet’s
assumption of independent voting and we allow for communication, the optimal commit-
tee size becomes bounded. The costs are reduced while the collective accuracy remains
roughly the same. This is because an exchange of information leads to an improvement in
individual skills which increases collective accuracy. Without communication and the pos-
sibility of learning the collective accuracy can be improved only by adding extra committee
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members (which is costly). The benefits of learning can also be seen from comparing the
results for the no learning and unlimited learning cases in the last row of the table. For
both, the optimal committee size and initial skill levels are the same. Still, the accuracy
of the collective decision in the communicating committee, which can be interpreted as
the final level of skills (just before taking the vote on interest rates) is much higher.
Another interesting observation is that, as the membership and time costs increase,
communication and learning become more crucial for the accuracy of collective decisions.
Looking at the last four rows of the table, we see that decision-making procedures involving
learning yield higher accuracy of collective decisions than any procedure that excludes
learning. In some cases they involve lower costs as well.
3.5 Discussion
Our results have interesting implications for actual monetary policy making, when con-
ducted in a committee. First of all, we show that what policy makers in real life indicate
to be an important characteristic of monetary policy committees, interaction, is benefi-
cial to the quality of interest rate decisions, since committee members learn from each
other. By sharing information, MPC members improve their knowledge about future eco-
nomic developments, which is beneficial to the monetary policy outcome. Gerlach-Kristen
(2003a) and Meade and Sheets (forthcoming) provide empirical support for this line of
reasoning. More specifically, if, as these authors seem to suggest, members of the hub
have a significant advantage vis-à-vis their colleagues in terms of knowledge and informa-
tion, our results indicate that it is beneficial to communicate, at least among each other.
Whether or not communication should be extended to all committee members depends
on the degree of skill asymmetry. If the asymmetry in initial skills is relatively large, this
paper advises against extending the scope of communication to all MPC members. This
is because learning, i.e. partially adopting the views expressed by others, means to some
extent giving up you own view. (Only) as long as the latter is qualitatively less than the
former, the collective outcome improves. Another implication for committee design is that
there seems to be a trade-off between communication and size in increasing the quality
of the collective outcome. Without communication, the quality of monetary policy can
only be improved by adding members. Alternatively, as it becomes more costly to add
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members to a MPC, communication and learning become more important to improve the
collective outcome.
We would like to conclude by stating that, while the main motivation of this research
is based on real life, i.e. the ’hub-and-spokes’ monetary policy committees of the US
Federal Reserve and the ECB, our analysis is highly stylized and contains some important
caveats. This should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. An example of such
a caveat is that in our simple set-up the only value added the hub provides is in terms of
improving the quality of decision-making in the committee. This is clearly a simplification
of reality, where ’hub-and-spokes’ committees tend to be motivated by other arguments
(see Chappell et al. (2005) for the US experience). Other important caveats include the
single-shot nature of our analysis, which clearly is at odds with the fact that monetary
policy decisions are taken on a regular basis, so that the intertemporal dimension may be
relevant for the current setting of interest rates. We plan to take up the latter issue in
future research.
3.6 Appendix. Proofs to propositions
Proposition 3.1 Assume that individual decisional skills are heterogeneous, i.e. qM (x, σM) >
qN (x, σN). The optimal decision making procedure is information sharing among all com-
mittee members, with the collective forecast being a weighted average of individual forecasts.
Proof. Assume that the updated collective estimate of inflation disturbance is computed
as a weighted average:
eEwCet+1 = Pm+ni=1 wiEi∈(M∪N),tet+1Pm+n
i=1 wi
(3.19)
The variance of the estimate eEwCet+1 is then given by:
V ar
³ eEwCet+1´ = µ 1nwN +mwM
¶2 ¡
nw2Nσ
2
N +mw
2
Mσ
2
M
¢
(3.20)
where σ2N and wN denote the uncertainty of the estimates made by the less-skilled commit-
tee members and the weight given to their estimates in computing the collective forecasts.
Analogously, σ2M and wM denote the uncertainty and the weight of the forecasts made by
the more-skilled committee members.
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Under the normalizing assumption nwN + mwM = m + n,12 we can compute the
weights wN and wM that minimize the variance V ar
¡
EwC,tet+1
¢
. They are given as:
wM =
(m+ n)σ2N
nσ2M +mσ
2
N
(3.21)
wN =
(m+ n) σ2M
nσ2M +mσ
2
N
(3.22)
Note that the weights are equal only if σ2N = σ
2
M , i.e. if qM (x, σM) = qM (x, σN). If
qM (x, σM) > qM (x, σN), implying σ2N > σ
2
M , we have wM > wN .
Proposition 3.2 Assume that individual decisional skills are heterogeneous, i.e. qN (x, σN) ∼
0.5 and qM (x, σM) > qN (x, σN). Depending on the size of the skill asymmetry, the opti-
mal decision making procedure could be approximated either by unweighted averaging of all
individual forecasts (for a relatively low asymmetry) or by limiting information sharing to
a pre-meeting by the more-skilled committee members (for a high skill asymmetry). Hence,
in case of a high skill asymmetry, the less-skilled committee members are redundant.
Proof. The optimal decision-making procedure yields the following accuracy of the col-
lective decision:
PWC (B|b) = qWC
Ã
x,
σMσNp
nσ2M +mσ
2
N
!
(3.23)
If the individual forecasts are not weighted, the collective accuracy is given as:
PC(B|b) = qC
Ã
x,
p
mσ2M + nσ
2
N
m+ n
!
(3.24)
In the case of communication and learning limited to the pre-meeting, the collective
accuracy becomes:
PLC(B|b) =Max
©
PNALC (B|b), PALC(B|b)
ª
(3.25)
where PNALC (B|b) refers to the situation when the more-skilled sub-group does not an-
nounce their common position before voting in the MPC, and is given as:
PNALC (B|b) = qM
µ
x,
σM√
m
¶
nP
s=n+m+1
2
−m
¡n
s
¢
(qN (x, σN))
s (1− qN (x, σN))n−s
+
µ
1− qM
µ
x,
σM√
m
¶¶
nP
s=n+m+1
2
¡n
s
¢
(qN (x, σN))
s (1− qN (x, σN))n−s (3.26)
12This assumption allows for a natural comparison with the case of no weighting, i.e. the case where
wN = wM = 1.
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and PALC(B|b) refers to the situation when the common position is announced, and is given
by:
PALC(B|b) = qM
µ
x,
σM√
m
¶
(3.27)
If qN (x, σN) ∼ 0.5, we have
PNALC (B|b) = qM
µ
x,
σM√
m
¶
nP
s=n+m+1
2
−m
¡n
s
¢
0.5n +
µ
1− qM
µ
x,
σM√
m
¶¶
nP
s=n+m+1
2
¡n
s
¢
0.5n
It can be shown that, for qN (x, σN) ∼ 0.5, PALC(B|b) ≥ PNALC (B|b):
PALC(B|b) ≥ PNALC (B|b)⇔
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µ
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2
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0.5n, the last inequality is certainly true
for qM
³
x, σM√m
´
≥ 0.5. Hence, for qN (x, σN) ∼ 0.5:
PLC(B|b) = PALC(B|b) = qM
µ
x,
σM√
m
¶
As a result, the comparison of the accuracy of the collective decisions achieved un-
der each of the three procedures boils down to comparing three standard deviations:
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Thus
PWC (B|b) ≥ PC(B|b)
Since
σMσNp
nσ2M +mσ
2
N
− σM√
m
= σM
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mσ2N−
√
nσ2M+mσ
2
N√
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Thus
PWC (B|b) ≥ PLC(B|b)
The comparison between the two sub-optimal decision making rules is less straight-
forward and depends on the degree of skill asymmetry:p
mσ2M + nσ
2
N
m+ n
− σM√
m
=
p
m (mσ2M + nσ
2
N)− (m+ n)σM√
m (m+ n)
σ2M ∼ σ2N : σM
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σ2M ∼ 0 :
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√
mn√
m (m+ n)
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Hence, if the asymmetry in skills is low, the unweighted averaging procedure yields
the collective accuracy which is higher than limited deliberations:
PLC(B|b) ≤ PC(B|b) ≤ PWC (B|b)
and, if the asymmetry is high, limited deliberations with announcement yield higher
accuracy than unweighted averaging. In this case, the less-skilled committee members
are redundant, as the collective decision is equivalent to the position of the more-skilled
committee members:
PC(B|b) ≤ PLC(B|b) ≤ PWC (B|b)
Proposition 3.3 If the skill asymmetry is very high, unweighted averaging of all
individual forecasts may even yield worse results than the decision making procedure which
excludes a communication stage.
Proof. The accuracy of the collective decision without communication is the maximum
of simple majority voting, two-tier voting with more-skilled committee members holding
a pre-meeting, and two-tier voting with more-skilled committee members announcing the
decision they reached in the pre-meeting to other committee members:
P (B|b) =Max©PSM(B|b), PNA(B|b), PA(B|b)ª (3.28)
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where
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In the case of highly asymmetric skills, i.e. qN (x, σN) ∼ 0.5 and qM (x, σM) ∼ 1,
P (B|b) = PA(B|b) (see Berk and Bierut (2005)), and:
lim
qN (x,σN )→0.5
qM (x,σM )→1
P (B|b) = 1
lim
qN (x,σN )→0.5
qM (x,σM )→1
PC(B|b) = qC
µ
x,
1.4826
√
n
m+ n
¶
The figure below presents the difference lim
qN (x,σN )→0.5
qM (x,σM )→1
P (B|b) − lim
qN (x,σN )→0.5
qM (x,σM )→1
PC(B|b) for
m between 2 and 20, and n between 1 and 29. It shows clearly that in smaller committees
lim
qN (x,σN )→0.5
qM (x,σM )→1
P (B|b) > lim
qN (x,σN )→0.5
qM (x,σM )→1
PC(B|b).
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Figure 3.6:
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Chapter 4
Central bank’s operations in the
reserve market
We address an issue in central bank policy making which has largely been taken for granted
in the literature so far1 - the frequency of open market operations (OMOs). However, in
reality the frequency of central banks’ operations in the reserve market is far from uniform.
Our objective therefore is to assess the effects of different frequencies in terms of achieving
the central bank’s operating target, i.e. controlling short-term interest rates.
We therefore narrow our interest to the link between the frequency of open market
operations and the volatility of overnight interest rates. Hence we will focus on controlling
interest rates through an appropriate management of liquidity in the reserve market.2 Let
us note that the overnight liquidity can be managed by establishing standing facilities as
well. However, open market operations are carried out on the initiative of the central
bank, whereas standing facilities are activated on demand by market participants. As a
result, central banks tend to steer liquidity mainly through open market operations and
to utilize standing facilities only as “safety valves” for end-of-day imbalances. The central
bank can furthermore introduce required reserves, an obligation for financial institutions
1With an exception of Hardy (1997), who examines the consequences of an informational advantage
on the side of reserve market participants versus the central bank.
2Overnight interest rates can be steered through a (tight) corridor between the rates on standing
facilities. Creating an interest rate corridor might be a very efficient way of steering overnight interest
rates. This approach, however, may practically eliminate the market for short-term liquidity (see also
Davies (1998)).
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to hold a certain level of liquidity over a specified period of time, which act as a ’buffer’
to stabilize overnight interest rates in the face of unexpected liquidity shocks (e.g. due
to autonomous factors, i.e. net foreign assets, net lending to the government, cash in
circulation, etc.). Averaging provisions, which allow for an averaged fulfillment of reserve
requirements, foster the stabilization function of required reserves by providing extra
flexibility in the face of fluctuations in market interest rates.
Table 4.1 summarizes actual operating frameworks applied in four monetary areas:
the euro area, United States, Japan and United Kingdom.3 All central banks except the
Bank of Japan4 use the interest rate as the main operating target.
As table 4.1 shows, the applied frequency of open market operations varies consider-
ably among the countries. These differences, however, do not necessarily translate into
diverging accuracy of controlling short-term interest rates, which we measure with the
level of the overnight interest rate volatility. Table 4.2 presents the average volatility,
defined as the average of squared deviations from the target rate, of the overnight market
rates in the euro area and the United Sates, Eonia and the federal funds (FF) rate. Av-
erage levels of the overnight volatility in the two monetary areas do not always differ in a
statistical sense, even though the Federal Reserve intervenes daily whereas the European
Central Bank only weekly.
We therefore conclude that more frequent interventions in the reserve market do not
automatically translate into more stable interest rates. This suggests that other instru-
ments at the disposal of the central bank must play an important role. We proceed by
investigating the three-way relation between the frequency of open market operations, the
volatility of overnight interest rates and the design of other central bank’s instruments.
In the following two sections we introduce our setup: a general specification of the
central bank’s liquidity management problem and a specific model for the 2-day reserve
maintenance period. In section 4.3 we present the results: the optimal liquidity provision
through open market operations and the resulting volatility of overnight interest rates.
We conclude by interpreting the results and providing empirical support for our findings
in section 4.4.
3For a comprehensive discussion, see Borio et al. (2001) or Borio (1997).
4Faced with a liquidity trap, deflation and a shrinking economy, the Bank of Japan changed its
operating target in March 2001 from the overnight call rate to the amount outstanding of financial
institutions’ current accounts (henceforth, reserves).
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Euro area UK USA Japan5
Lending
facility
Applied Applied6 Applied
but not
important
Applied
but not
important
Deposit
facility
Applied - - -
Outright
OMOs
Applied7 Applied Applied Applied
Reverse
OMOs
Applied Applied Applied Applied
Frequency Weekly More than
once a day
Daily More than
once a day
Required
reserves
Applied -8 Applied
but not
important
Applied
Averaging
provi-
sions
Applied - Applied Applied
Table 4.1: Selected central bank operating frameworks
Eonia FF rate F-statistic
1999 0.037 0.028 1.394
2000 0.033 0.015 8.141
2001 0.059 0.040 0.771
2002 0.021 0.003 11.058
Table 4.2: Average overnight volatility in the euro zone and the US
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Our work comes closest to the contribution of Bartolini et al. (2002), who present
a positive analysis of the effects of the Fed’s ’intervention style’, that is unlimited and
limited-size open market operations, on the volatility of the FF rate. Contrary to the
study of Bartolini et al. (2002), the analysis presented below is fully normative.
4.1 Analytical setup
We assume that the central bank’s operational framework is designed to deliver the desired
level (i) of the overnight interest rate (it), therefore the objective of the central bank is
to minimize the following loss function:
L = E
"
TX
t=1
(it − i)2
#
(4.1)
where E denotes the expectations operator and T is the length of the maintenance period.
The model of the reserve market consists of two equations9:
• the supply equation, derived from the central bank’s balance sheet identity.:
rt = mt + st − at (4.2)
where rt denotes reserves held by the banking sector, mt - open market operations10,
st - net standing facilities (i.e. the difference between the lending facility and the
deposit facility) and at - net autonomous factors (outside the control of the central
bank).11
Autonomous factors constitute an exogenous stochastic element in the supply of liq-
uidity. We assume that in each sub-period t their expected value E [at] is equal to the
9The model builds on the work developed in the European Monetary Institute in the preparatory
phase for the Stage Three of the Economic and Monetary Union.
10The regular main refinancing operations in case of the ECB. We will ignore ad hoc operations (struc-
tural and fine-tuning) and the longer term refinancing operations, which (by construction) are carried
out only once per maintenance period.
11Data on the ECB’s balance sheet indicate that reserves held by the banking sector have, on average,
constituted around 54,7% and net autonomous factors - 45,0% of liabilities. On the assets’ side, 73,6%
of liquidity was provided via main refinancing operations and 26,1% via longer term operations. The
deposit and lending facilities accounted for around 0,3% of assets and liabilities, respectively. (Source:
European Central Bank (2002))
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central bank’s forecast, which we denote as aft .
12 The size of open market operations is
determined by the central bank, based on publicly available information. Consequently
the size of open market operations is deterministic. The recourse to standing facilities of
the central bank is assumed to represent errors made by commercial banks in the man-
agement of reserve funds. Assuming that these errors are non-systematic, the expected
size of the net facilities is zero: E [st] = 0.
• the demand equation, derived form an inventory theoretical model of reserve man-
agement (see the appendix (section 4.5)):
rt = −αtrt−1 − βtret+1 + γtR− δtit + εt (4.3)
where ret+1 denotes the expected reserves to be held in the sub-period t + 1, R is
the level of required reserves, it is the overnight rate and εt is the (white noise)
disturbance in the demand for reserves (which may correspond to the demand for
reserves necessary to settle transactions with other banks, etc.).
The demand equation (4.3) has two important characteristics. First of all, we assume
that banks manage their reserve holdings based on the cost of obtaining the funds (it) on
the one hand and the compulsory level of reserves imposed by the central bank (R) on
the other hand. Furthermore, the specification emphasizes the intertemporal character of
funds’ management: commercial banks are supposed to analyze their reserve position in
the context of several sub-periods within the reserve maintenance period (sub-periods t−1,
t and t+ 1). To be more specific, if all model parameters are non-negative, the weighted
average of reserves that commercial banks are willing to hold over three consecutive sub-
periods (rt + αtrt−1 + βtr
e
t+1) is assumed to be positively related to the level of required
reserves13 and negatively related to the overnight interest rate. The imposed parameter
assumptions result in the behavior of reserves driven by interest rate expectations as
described in the literature: in order to minimize the cost of holding reserves, commercial
banks try to front- or back-load reserves if they expect interest rates to increase or decrease
later on in the maintenance period.14
12This assumption seems justifiable, since the annual averages of ECB’s forecasts were approximately
equal to the averages of actual autonomous factors (for 2001 and 2002).
13This characteristic seems to be in line with the averaging provision.
14See e.g. Swank (1995), Bindseil (2000) and Borio et al. (2001). In our model ∂rt∂iet+1 =
∂rt
∂ret+1
∂ret+1
∂iet+1
=
−βt(−δt+1) > 0 if β, δ > 0.
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t 1 2
αt 0.38 0.69
βt 0.78 0.18
γt 2.15 1.69
δt 0.22 0.05
Table 4.3: Calibrated model coefficients
We estimated equation (4.3) for the euro area.15 This exercise provided us with the
following indicative values for the model parameters, as presented in table 4.3.16 These
results corroborate our assumption of non-negativity for all model parameters. Moreover,
the estimated values will be useful for evaluating the results of our analysis. It is therefore
important to take note of the following relations: 0 < αt < 1, 0 < βt < 1, and γt > 1.
In the remainder of the paper we will investigate in detail the simplest case for a 2-day
reserve maintenance period (T = 2). This case is of interest, as it combines analytical
tractability with policy-relevant features. Our framework differs considerably from the
existing literature, which focuses on the reserve market in either the euro area17 or the
US18. Our approach can be applied to both monetary areas as it captures an (intertempo-
ral) dependency between liquidity and interest rates and does not represent interest rates
as weighted averages of the rates on standing facilities.19
15Ideally, we should have estimates for the United States as well. However, for the US, the data
regarding the sub-periods within a single maintenance period are not available.
16The results were obtained by splitting the reserve maintenance period into two 2-week sub-periods.
For further details, see appendix 2 (section 4.6).
17See e.g. Ayuso and Repullo (2003), Bartolini et al. (2001), Bindseil (2000), Quirós and Mendizábal
(2001) and Välimäki (2002).
18See e.g. Bartolini et al. (2002) and Furfine (1998).
19Averaging is justified in the case of the euro area but problematic in the case of the United States.
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4.2 Interest rates over a 2-day reserve maintenance
period
We solve for interest rates on both days of the maintenance period using equation (4.3)
written for t = 1, 2:
r1 = −α1r0 − β1re2 + γ1R− δ1i1 + ε1 (4.4)
r2 = −α2r1 − β2re3 + γ2R− δ2i2 + ε2 (4.5)
The first equality implies
i1 =
1
δ1
(γ1R− β1re2 − r1 − α1r0 + ε1) (4.6)
and the second
i2 =
1
δ2
(γ2R− r2 − α2r1 − β2re3 + ε2) (4.7)
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) reveal that a central bank will be able to steer interest rates
through liquidity provision if and only if the following conditions hold: δ1 6= 0 and δ2 6= 0.
Otherwise market interest rates are uncontrollable.
Using the supply equation (4.2) we can write the above expressions in terms of open
market operations, autonomous factors and standing facilities:
i1 =
1
δ1
(γ1R− β1(m2 − af2)− (m1 − a1 + s1)− α1r0 + ε1) (4.8)
i2 =
1
δ2
(γ2R− (m2 − a2 + s2)− α2(m1 − a1 + s1)− β2re3 + ε2) (4.9)
where we have made use of the assumptions regarding the non-stochastic character of
open market operations and the zero expected value of net standing facilities made in the
previous section.
Overnight interest rates are lower if there is more liquidity available in the market due
to open market operations, net liquidity-providing autonomous factors (negative at’s) and
net standing facilities. Lower required reserves also reduce market interest rates.
In subsequent sections we will calculate the size of open market operations necessary
to keep interest rates given by expressions (4.8) and (4.9) as close as possible to the target
rate i. We will do this first under the assumption that the central bank intervenes in
the reserve market twice - that will be our frequent (multiple) intervention benchmark.
Secondly, we will explore the consequences of intervening less frequently, i.e. only once,
within the maintenance period.
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4.3 Multiple vs single open market operations
The central bank that wants to use open market operations to minimize the volatility of
interest rates around the operating target, has to solve the following stochastic optimiza-
tion problem:
Minm1,m2 L = E[(i1 − i)2 + (i2 − i)2] (4.10)
subject to conditions (4.8), (4.9) and r0 = re3 = 0
The last constraint is added to improve the transparency of the analysis and is justified
if we restrict our attention to the relationship between interest rates and reserves held
within a single maintenance period.20
The sequence of events is as follows: before the beginning of the maintenance period
the central bank calculates its forecasts of autonomous factors for both days and makes
them public. The level of required reserves as well as the target interest rate are also
known to market participants. The central bank has to decide on its operations before it
observes the realization the autonomous factors and the reserves’ demand disturbance on
the first day of the maintenance period.
If the operational framework of the central bank presumes open market operations
only on one day of the maintenance period, it implies that the size of one of the open
market operations mt in expressions (4.8) and (4.9) should by assumption be set to zero.
Carrying out open market operations towards the end of the reserve maintenance period
raises issues related to the availability and usefulness of information on liquidity conditions
at the beginning of the maintenance period. If midway through the maintenance period
data on the actual level of autonomous factors, the recourse to standing facilities and the
actual shock to the demand for reserves on the first day of the reserve maintenance period
(i.e. a1, s1 and ε1) is available, the subsequent optimal provision of the central bank’s
liquidity should take these factors into account.
If required reserves are imposed, with the averaging provision in place, then it is nat-
ural that the optimal liquidity provision open market operations should ensure a smooth
fulfillment of the reserve requirements. In the case of a 2-day reserve maintenance pe-
20r0 is the level of reserves held in the preceding maintenance period and re3 is the expected level of
reserves on the first day of the following maintenance period.
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riod, that implies the following condition21 (
m1−af1)+(m2−a
f
2)
2
= R or the set of conditions:
∂(m1+m2)
∂R = 2,
∂(m1+m2)
∂af1
= ∂(m1+m2)
∂af2
= 1, ∂(m1+m2)∂i = 0.
Under the multiple operations’ strategy, the optimal provision of liquidity reads as
follows:
m∗1 = a
f
1 +
β1γ2 − γ1
β1α2 − 1
R+
δ1 − δ2β1
β1α2 − 1
i (4.11)
m∗2 = a
f
2 +
α2γ1 − γ2
β1α2 − 1
R+
δ2 − α2δ1
β1α2 − 1
i (4.12)
If the frequency of open market operations is limited, then the optimal provision of
liquidity is given as:
m∗∗1 = a
f
1 +
δ22β1+α2δ
2
1
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
af2 +
δ22γ1+α2δ
2
1γ2
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
R− δ1δ2 δ2+α2δ1δ22+α22δ21 i (4.13)
if open market operations are carried out on the first day of the reserve maintenance
period and
m∗∗2 = a
f
2 +
β1δ
2
2+δ
2
1α2
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
af1 +
δ21γ2+β1δ
2
2γ1
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
R− δ1δ2 β1δ2+δ1β21δ22+δ21 i (4.14)
or
bm∗∗2 = af2 + α2δ21+β1δ22β21δ22+δ21 (a1 − s1) + β1δ22β21δ22+δ21 ε1 + δ21γ2+β1δ22γ1β21δ22+δ21 R− δ1δ2 β1δ2+δ1β21δ22+δ21 i (4.15)
if the operations are carried out at the end of the reserve maintenance period. Equation
(4.14) describes the provision of funds if data on liquidity conditions is available with
considerable lags. If data is produced timely, the optimal size of day-2 operations should
be calculated according to formula (4.15). Relative to m∗∗2 , bm∗∗2 is determined based on
the actual level of outstanding autonomous factors after day-1 (a1 − s1) instead of the
absolute forecast af1 . Moreover, bm∗∗2 is adjusted in response to the realization of the shock
in the demand for liquidity ε1.
21Derived from E[r1]+E[r2]2 = R, where r1 and r2 are given by equation (4.2).
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Our calibrated coefficient values indicate the following derivatives in the euro area:22
m∗1 +m
∗
2 m
∗∗
1 m
∗∗
2 or bm∗∗2
af1
23 1 1 α2ρ
2+β1
β21+ρ2



→ 0.69 if ρ→∞
= 0.71 if ρ = 4.4
af2 1
β1+α2ρ
2
1+α22ρ
2



→ 1.45 if ρ→∞
= 1.38 if ρ = 4.4
1
R 2.25 γ1+α2γ2ρ
2
1+α22ρ
2



→ 2.45 if ρ→∞
= 2.42 if ρ = 4.4
ρ2γ2+β1γ1
β21+ρ2



→ 1.69 if ρ→∞
= 1.72 if ρ = 4.4
i
0 if δt= 0
−0.17 if δt 6= 0
0 if δt= 0
−0.09 if δt 6= 0
0 if δt= 0
−0.06 if δt 6= 0
The calibrated coefficients of the optimal provision of liquidity through multiple open
market operations correspond very well to the numbers implied by the smooth fulfillment
of averaged required reserves. If the central bank would limit the frequency of the liquidity
provision through OMOs, then the smooth fulfillment conditions would hold, if commercial
banks would adjust their behavior, so that α2 and β1 would come closer to unity and γ1
would be roughly equal and would approach two.
Let us now consider the behavior of market interest rates. If the central bank employs
multiple open market operations, then it is able to keep market interest rates on average be
equal to the target rate.24 Not surprisingly, if we reduce the frequency of interventions,25
then overnight interest rates may not be equal the target rate, even on average. In formal
terms: Under multiple open market operations, the market interest rates are given as
follows:
i1(m∗1,m
∗
2) = i+
1
δ1
(a1 − af1 − s1 + ε1) (4.16)
i2(m∗1,m
∗
2) = i+
1
δ2
(a2 − af2 − s2 + α2
³
a1 − af1 − s1
´
+ ε2) (4.17)
As a result
E [i1(m∗1,m
∗
2)− i] = E [i2(m∗1,m∗2)− i] = 0 (4.18)
22ρ denotes the ratio of interest rates elasticities: ρ = δ1/δ2. If δ2 → 0 then ρ → ∞. ρ = 4.4
corresponds to the parameters presented in table 4.3.
23Or (a1 − s1) in case of bm∗∗2 .
24So that the Tinbergen principle of one instrument-one goal (one intervention-stabilizing interest rate
in one sub-period) is satisfied.
25Thereby removing one of the instruments, but leaving two objectives.
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If the central bank implements the open market operations only on the first day of
the reserve maintenance period, interest rates in the reserve market are given by:
i1(m∗∗1 ) =
δ22+α2δ1δ2
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
i+ α2δ1(β1α2−1)
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
af2 +
α2δ1(γ1α2−γ2)
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
R
+ 1δ1
³
a1 − af1 − s1 + ε1
´
(4.19)
i2(m∗∗1 ) =
δ2δ1α2+α22δ
2
1
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
i− δ2(β1α2−1)
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
af2 −
δ2(γ1α2−γ2)
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
R
+ 1δ2
³
a2 − af2 − s2 + α2
³
a1 − af1 − s1
´
+ ε2
´
(4.20)
Therefore:
E [i1(m∗∗1 )− i] = α2δ1δ22+α22δ21
³
(δ2 − α2δ1) i+ (β1α2 − 1) af2 + (γ1α2 − γ2)R
´
(4.21)
E [i2(m∗∗1 )− i] = − δ2δ22+α22δ21
³
(δ2 − α2δ1) i+ (β1α2 − 1) af2 + (γ1α2 − γ2)R
´
(4.22)
Contrary to the case of multiple open market operations, the average control errors
E [it(m∗∗1 )− i] are non-zero and depend on the relations between parameters of the model.
The reasoning is analogous for the open market operations carried out only on the second
day of the reserve maintenance period. The informational issues will have impact on the
interest rate on the second day of the reserve maintenance period only. The interest rate
i1(m∗∗2 ) depends on the information available at time t = 0 and is given by:
i1(m∗∗2 ) = i1(bm∗∗2 ) = β21δ22+β1δ2δ1β21δ22+δ21 i+ δ1(γ1−β1γ2)β21δ22+δ21 R− δ1(β1α2−1)β21δ22+δ21 af1
+ 1δ1
³
a1 − af1 − s1 + ε1
´
(4.23)
i2(m∗∗2 ) depends on the information available through t = 1 and will settle at:
i2(m∗∗2 ) =
β1δ2δ1+δ
2
1
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
i+ β1δ2(β1γ2−γ1)
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
R+ β1δ2(β1α2−1)
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
af1
+ 1δ2
³
a2 − af2 − s2 + α2
³
a1 − af1 − s1
´
+ ε2
´
(4.24)
or
i2(bm∗∗2 ) = β1δ2δ1+δ21β21δ22+δ21 i+ β1δ2(β1γ2−γ1)β21δ22+δ21 R+ β1δ2(β1α2−1)β21δ22+δ21 (a1 − s1)
− β1δ2
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
ε1 + 1δ2
³
a2 − af2 − s2 + ε2
´
(4.25)
We have assumed that E [at] = a
f
t for t = 1, 2, where a
f
t is the central bank’s forecast,
E [st] = 0 and εt is a white-noise disturbance. As a result the magnitude of the control
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errors does not depend on the data availability and is given by:
E [i1(m∗∗2 )− i] = E [i1(bm∗∗2 )− i]
= δ1
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
³
(β1δ2 − δ1) i+ (1− β1α2) a
f
1 + (γ1 − β1γ2)R
´
(4.26)
E [i2(m∗∗2 )− i] = E [i2(bm∗∗2 )− i]
= − β1δ2
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
³
(β1δ2 − δ1) i+ (1− β1α2) af1 + (γ1 − β1γ2)R
´
(4.27)
which can deviate from zero.
However, the size of required reserves is also determined by the central bank, and here
the importance of this instrument is clearly shown:
Proposition 4.1 The control errors, i.e. average deviations of market interest rates from
the target due to infrequent open market operations, can be reduced if required reserves are
set according to the formulas:
R(m∗∗1 ) =
(δ2 − α2δ1) i+ (β1α2 − 1) af2
γ1α2 − γ2
(3.19)
for the operations carried out at the beginning of the reserve maintenance period, and
R(m∗∗2 ) =
(β1δ2 − δ1) i+ (1− β1α2) a
f
1
γ1 − β1γ2
(3.20)
for the operations carried out at the end of the maintenance period.
Proof. See formulas (4.21) and (4.22): E [i1(m∗∗1 )− i] = E [i2(m∗∗1 )− i] = 0 if δ2−α2δ1 =
β1α2 − 1 = γ1α2 − γ2 = 0 or R = R(m∗∗1 ). Similarly (formulas (4.26) and (4.27)):
E [i1(m∗∗2 )− i] = E [i2(m∗∗2 )− i] = 0 if β1δ2 − δ1 = 1 − β1α2 = γ1 − β1γ2 = 0 or
R = R(m∗∗2 ).
Furthermore, an effective use of required reserves, i.e. setting the requirements at the
appropriate level (given by formulas (3.19) and (3.20)), affects the overnight volatility, and
allows central bank to limit the frequency of interventions in the reserve market without
a significant increase in the volatility of interest rates:
Proposition 4.2 1. If the control errors are eliminated, then the volatility of overnight
interest rates does not increase with the reduction in the frequency of open market
operations. It is therefore possible to limit the frequency of central bank’s interven-
tions in the reserve market without a significant increase in the volatility of interest
rates.
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2. The availability of real-time data on the liquidity conditions throughout the mainte-
nance period is likely to represent an additional factor dampening the excess volatil-
ity of overnight interest rates associated with a reduction in the frequency of open
market operations.
Proof. The volatility of overnight interest rates under the multiple operations’ strategy
L(m∗1,m
∗
2) is given by:
L(m∗1,m
∗
2) = E[(i1(m
∗
1,m
∗
2)− i)2 + (i1(m∗1,m∗2)− i)2]
=
δ22+δ
2
1(α22+1)
δ21δ
2
2
σ2a +
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
δ21δ
2
2
σ2s1 +
1
δ22
σ2s2 +
δ22+δ
2
1
δ21δ
2
2
σ2ε (3.21)
The corresponding loss in the case when open market operations are carried out solely on
the first day of the reserve maintenance period is given as:
L(m∗∗1 ) = L(m
∗
1,m
∗
2) +
1
δ22+α
2
2δ
2
1
³
(δ2 − α2δ1) i+ (β1α2 − 1) a
f
2 + (γ1α2 − γ2)R
´2
(3.22)
whereas the loss incurred when the operations take place on the second day of the reserve
maintenance period is given as:
L(m∗∗2 ) = L(m
∗
1,m
∗
2) +
1
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
³
(β1δ2 − δ1) i+ (1− β1α2) a
f
1 + (γ1 − β1γ2)R
´2
(3.23)
Therefore, ifR = R(m∗∗1 ) (R = R(m
∗∗
2 )), then L(m
∗∗
1 ) = L(m
∗
1,m
∗
2) (L(m
∗∗
2 ) = L(m
∗
1,m
∗
2)).
The use of real-time information affects the ex-ante expected volatility loss: L(bm∗∗2 ) is
given by:
L(bm∗∗2 ) = L(m∗∗2 ) + β21δ22(β21δ22+δ21)2σ2ε +
µ³
β1δ2(β1α2−1)
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
´2
− α
2
2
δ22
¶¡
σ2a + σ
2
s1
¢
(3.24)
Since
µ³
β1δ2(β1α2−1)
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
´2
− α
2
2
δ22
¶
− β
2
1δ
2
2
(β21δ22+δ21)
2 = −α2 2β
3
1δ
4
2+2α2β
2
1δ
2
2δ
2
1+α2δ
4
1
(β21δ22+δ21)
2
δ22
≤ 0, then (unless σ2ε
is much larger than
¡
σ2a + σ
2
s1
¢
), L(bm∗∗2 ) < L(m∗∗2 ).
The second part of proposition 1 leads to an immediate result:
Proposition 4.3 If δ2/δ1 → 0, then foregoing open market operations at the beginning
of the reserve maintenance period is likely to yield lower excess overnight volatility than
foregoing operations at the end of the maintenance period.
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Eonia t-statistic FF rate t-statistic
1999 0.026 2.189 -0.006 -0.568
2000 0.109 11.786 0.018 2.444
2001 0.090 6.375 -0.014 -1.113
2002 0.068 8.588 -0.002 -0.475
Table 4.4: Average interest rate control errors in the euro zone and the US
Proof. The difference between the losses in terms of excess overnight volatility due to
limited frequency of open market operations is given as:
L(m∗∗1 )− L(m∗∗2 ) = 1δ22+α22δ21
³
(δ2 − α2δ1) i+ (β1α2 − 1) af2 + (γ1α2 − γ2)R
´2
− 1
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
³
(β1δ2 − δ1) i+ (1− β1α2) af1 + (γ1 − β1γ2)R
´2
If δ2/δ1 → 0, then 1δ22+α22δ21 ≥
1
β21δ
2
2+δ
2
1
and, for control errors of comparable magnitude,
L(m∗∗1 ) ≥ L(m∗∗2 ) ≥ L(bm∗∗2 ).
4.4 Discussion
The model predicts that average control errors in the US should be smaller than in the
euro area since the Federal Reserve intervenes every day. These conclusions are supported
by the empirical evidence, reported in table 4.4. Annual average deviations of the federal
funds rate from the target are hardly ever significantly different from zero. The average
control errors in the management of the overnight interest rate in the euro area are always
significantly different from zero, although their magnitude is very small.
Nevertheless, it is the overnight volatility, which we are mostly concerned about. Our
results suggest that comparable levels of overnight interest rates volatility in the euro
area and in the United States are due an appropriate use of required reserves. Table
4.5 presents average levels of required reserves in comparison to average levels of net
autonomous factors in Europe and in the United States over the years 1999-2002.
Comparing this table with the overnight volatility numbers (reported in table 4.2), we
can conclude that there seems to exist a unique ratio of average required reserves and the
average of forecasted autonomous factors yielding the best results in terms of reducing the
excess overnight volatility: R/aft close to 1.25. The results of our analysis indeed confirm
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Euro area (EUR bln) USA (USD bln)
R aft R/a
f
t R E [at]
26 R/E [at]
1999 101.69 84.3427 1.206 41.63 536.75 0.008
2000 111.64 113.26 0.986 38.95 571.62 0.007
2001 123.73 94.86 1.304 38.45 601.49 0.006
2002 129.88 54.30 2.392 38.76 654.36 0.006
Table 4.5: Required reserves and autonomous factors in the euro area and the US
that such a ratio should exist. Moreover, the empirical ratio corresponds surprisingly well
to average of the model-implied ratios:28 1
2
³
∂R(m∗∗1 )
∂af2
+
∂R(m∗∗2 )
∂af1
´
= 1.3957.
Although we have to acknowledge that our findings are based on certain simplifications
vis-a-vis actual practises (e.g. an implicit treatment of averaging provisions) we were
still able to address interesting policy-related issues regarding the factors affecting the
overnight volatility. We have identified the crucial factor reducing the overnight volatility
in the euro area and bringing it in line with the overnight volatility in the United States:
the appropriate level of required reserves implemented by the European Central Bank.
4.5 Appendix 1. Inventory model of the demand for
reserves
In this section we seek to provide very simple micro-foundations for the error correction
mechanism given by equation (4.3). Let us assume, that a representative commercial bank
wants to minimize the discounted cost of holding reserves over the reserve maintenance
period of length T , given as the sum of the following components:
1. opportunity cost
TX
t=1
δtitrt
where δ is the discount factor, it is the overnight interest rate and rt is the level of
reserves
28Calibrated using the values reported in table 4.3.
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2. cost of having excess reserves on the last day of the maintenance period
(iT − id) δT
ÃÃ
1
T
TX
t=1
rt −R
!
+ x
!
Pr(
1
T
TX
t=1
rt + x > R)
3. cost of being short of reserve requirements on day T
ifδ
T
Ã
x+
Ã
1
T
TX
t=1
rt −R
!!
Pr(
1
T
TX
t=1
rt + x < R)
where x is the liquidity shock on the last day of the maintenance period.
If we assume that this shock is uniformly distributed over [−M,M ] (where negative
(positive) values correspond to an unexpected outflow (inflow) of liquidity), the bank is
facing the following costs:
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The expected costs of holding reserves are then given as:
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The First Order Condition with respect to time-t reserve holdings is given as:
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It follows that the relationship between day-t reserves and other variables in the model
is:
∂rt
∂rt−1
< 0,
∂rt
∂rt+1
< 0,
∂rt
∂R
> 0,
∂rt
∂it
< 0
4.6 Appendix 2. Regression results
The regressions were carried out on weekly data on the ECB’s operations for 1999-2001.
The reserve maintenance period was divided into two 2-week sub-periods. The series used
were: the average current accounts during the first two weeks (r1t ), the average current
accounts during the last two weeks (r2t ), the required reserves (R) and average Eonia
rate during the first and the last two weeks of the reserve maintenance period (i1t and i
2
t ,
respectively).
Series Mean StDev ADF test statistic Unit Root
r1t 11.89604 0.989459 -1.354202 Yes
r2t 11.79642 1.249543 -1.149758 Yes
R 11.74642 1.090253 -1.290094 Yes
i1t 3.676041 0.777347 -2.353858 Yes
i2t 3.632088 0.825898 -2.477763 Yes
The VAR estimations29 yield the following coefficients for first sub-period of the main-
tenance period (standard errors in () and t-statistics in []):
α1 β1 γ1 δ1
0.381094
(0.17963)
[2.12150]
0.775794
(0.12214)
[6.35149]
2.153058
NA
NA
0.223444
(0.15687)
[1.42440]
For the second sub-period of the maintenance period the estimated VAR coefficients
were:
29The stationary variables used were the excess reserves (i.e. rt − R) and first differences of interst
rates.
82 CHAPTER 4. CENTRAL BANK’S OPERATIONS IN THE RESERVE MARKET
α2 β2 γ2 δ2
0.688416
(0.09902)
[6.95210]
0.177981
(0.11218)
[1.58658]
1.688416
NA
NA
0.048781
(0.10721)
[0.45500]
Both coefficients on interest rate in the first and second sub-periods of the reserve
maintenance period in the euro zone are barely statistically significant, although they are
of the correct sign.
Chapter 5
Summary and conclusions
5.1 Summary
In the first part of this thesis we have taken a closer look at the effects of collective
decision making on the behavior of monetary policy makers. In the case when decisions
are taken by a group, instead of a single person, matters such as decision rules and
deliberation protocols gain importance and can be modified to make the most efficient
use of differences in policy makers’ views on the economy, their information and skills. In
chapter 2 we have investigated possible improvements of the structure of the monetary
policy committee, which would give appropriate attention to these inherent differences.
It is well-known from the jury literature that, if committee members have hetero-
geneous expertise, then the optimal (first-best) decision rule should weight their votes
according to their skills. However, in most real-life situations, and in particular in mone-
tary policy committees, votes are not weighted according to expertise. Instead, decisions
are taken by simple majority. Hence, a sub-optimal decision rule is applied and, as
a result, the accuracy of collective decision deteriorates in comparison to the first-best
outcome. Depending on the heterogeneity in committee members’ expertise and the com-
mittee size, the loss in accuracy can reach up to 35.5%. In other words, due to procedural
shortcomings, the probability that the MPC takes the correct decision is lowered by up
to 35.5%.
We have shown that an appropriate structuring of the committee eliminates the inef-
ficient use of heterogeneous expertise of committee members, while retaining the simple
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majority voting rule. We proposed to divide the committee into two sub-groups accord-
ing to expertise, allow the more-skilled group to meet prior to the actual policy meeting
and to produce a common position regarding the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
Subsequently, the two groups should jointly take a vote on interest rates. In addition
to an efficient use of the available information, our solution has additional advantages,
as it combines several prescriptions suggested by Janis (1982) to prevent a detrimental
concurrence-seeking group dynamics, labelled as groupthink, from occurring.
Creating a subgroup of more-skilled members improves the accuracy of collective de-
cisions. This structure works particularly well in a relatively small committee and com-
pletely eliminates the inefficiency stemming from the use of simple majority voting rule.
In larger committees, the inefficiency is reduced but not eliminated, in particular when
expertise of committee members is highly heterogeneous. However, by requiring higher-
skilled committee members to communicate their common position before the vote on
interest rates, the quality of monetary policy could again be enhanced to approximate
the first-best result. This is because the announcement provides an additional, highly
accurate, common signal to the less-skilled committee members; their rational choice is
to follow this signal instead of their own, far less accurate, information.
In chapter 3 we have taken another step in assessing the impact of collective decision
making on the quality of monetary policy. We formulated a model capturing interaction
and exchange of information among committee members. Both effects are considered to
be important characteristics of real-life monetary policy committees (Goodfriend (1999)).
We have assumed that monetary policy committee members share a common view
on the model of the economy but have their own, independently formulated, views on
future shocks to the inflation rate. Hence, they all have different beliefs regarding the
appropriate monetary policy stance, even if they share a common inflation objective. If the
decision making procedure foresees only simultaneous voting, a committee would adopt
the median interest rate. If committee members can share and pool their views, their
expertise is likely to improve. We label this process as ’learning’. We have shown that
learning improves the accuracy of collective decisions, even though it introduces a positive
correlation between the votes of committee members. At its maximum, the improvement
comes out at 50%.
If all committee members participate in information sharing and learning, they should
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form a common estimate of economic shocks. Optimally, such estimate should involve
weighting of the information that has been shared according to the level of individual
expertise (as in the case of simple decision-making rules which do not involve interaction).
However, this optimal procedure need not be applied in reality. Our analysis shows that
implementing simpler decision-making rules which do not require weighting, such as simple
averaging of individual estimates or limiting information exchange to the more-skilled
committee members, can again approximate the optimal outcome.
Lastly, we have compared the net benefits of different decision making procedures
discussed in both chapters, having imposed the costs on committee participation and on
meeting duration. Allowing for communication among committee members makes the
optimal committee size bounded, even if the costs are minimal (without communication
we would have the Condorcet’s result: the optimal committee size would be infinite). This
is because an exchange of information leads to an improvement in individual skills which
increases collective accuracy. Without communication and the possibility of learning the
collective accuracy can be improved only by adding extra committee members (which
is costly). As the membership and time costs increase, communication and learning
become more and more crucial for the accuracy of collective decisions: decision-making
procedures involving learning yield higher collective accuracy than any procedure that
excludes learning. In some cases they involve lower costs as well.
In the second part of the thesis, we have turned to analyzing institutional aspects of
central bank’s implementation of monetary policy. We have adopted the ’new view’ on
monetary policy implementation (Bindseil (2005)), assuming that a short-term interest
rate represents the appropriate operational target, and standing facilities, open market
operations and required reserves are the instruments useful in steering short-term interest
rates. This approach has achieved a considerable degree of consensus over the last ten to
fifteen years. Nevertheless, it still allows for a considerable room for discretion as regards
the exact instrument mix: the level and characteristics of reserve requirements, the type
and frequency of open market operations and the width of the interest rate corridor set
by standing facilities.
In chapter 4 we have shown, based on real-life examples of the euro area and the United
States, that a central bank can achieve comparable levels of interest rate stabilization
using quite diverse operating frameworks. An important conclusion is that more frequent
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central bank operations in the overnight reserve market do not automatically translate
into more stable interest rates. Other instruments play an important role as well. This
conclusion has led us to formulate a model of the overnight reserve market, where the
central bank carries out open market operations with the objective of minimizing the
deviations of overnight interest rates from the target rate. Commercial banks are subject
to reserve requirements, and therefore their objective is to minimize the opportunity cost
of holding reserves throughout the reserve maintenance period and the penalty costs of
being long or short of reserves at the end of the maintenance period.
The model predicts that, regardless of the design of required reserves and standing fa-
cilities, the average deviation of the overnight interest rate from the target rate is higher if
the frequency of open market operations is lower. This result is supported by the empirical
evidence. The Federal Reserve carries open market operations daily while the European
Central Bank operates weekly: annual average deviations of the Federal Funds rate from
the target are hardly ever significantly different from zero, while average deviations for
the Eonia rate always significantly differ from zero.
Further, we show that the overnight volatility may be negatively related to the fre-
quency of open market operations, meaning that reducing the frequency is likely to pro-
duce increased overnight volatility. However, the model generates a relationship for calcu-
lating an appropriate level of required reserves necessary to eliminate such excess volatility.
These results are also supported by the data: the average annual overnight volatility in the
euro area is not necessarily statistically different from the volatility in the United States.
Moreover, the average ratio of autonomous factors and required reserves in the euro area,
calculated for the years 1999-2002, is 1.25; calibrated model-implied ratio amounts to 1.4.
The similarity is striking. We conclude that this result explains the statistical insignifi-
cance of the difference between overnight volatility levels in the two monetary areas.
5.2 Applications and suggestions for further research
The results of the chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis can be applied to explaining the ex-
perimental findings discussed in the introduction to this volume. Blinder and Morgan
(forthcoming) found that majority decisions quickly evolved into unanimous decisions.
This result comes about for the same reason as the herding of the less-skilled commit-
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tee members, described in chapter 2: a majority position constitutes a highly accurate
common signal to other committee members, which they rationally cannot ignore. Lom-
bardelli et al. (2002) found that groups gave more weight to the better and less weight to
the worse committee members. This empirical finding is consistent with the theoretical
literature, which shows that such behavior consists the most efficient decision making
procedure in a committee composed of individuals with diverse levels of expertise. Both
experiments resulted in the conclusion that "a committee performs better than a sum of
its parts": the accuracy of group decisions has exceeded both the average of individual
scores and the median score that would be obtained under pure simultaneous and inde-
pendent voting. Chapter 3 gives a theoretical rationale for this result. It is due to the fact
that committee members exchange information, and therefore improve their performance.
Their higher expertise naturally translates into higher quality of collective decisions.
The theoretical results from chapters 2 and 3 provide a rationale for a number of
findings from the empirical literature, which has studied the behavior of members of
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve and the Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England. Gerlach-Kristen (2003a), for example,
provides evidence that the less experienced MPC members tend to vote with the majority
position (on average they dissent for the first time at their ninth meeting.). This is
a direct application of the results from chapter 2. Meade (2002) has found that the
likelihood of voiced dissents has been comparable between the FOMC and the MPC:
14% in the first and 16.6% in the latter. However, the percentage of formal dissents (i.e.
dissenting votes) in the FOMC was only 7.8%. The study covers the period 1992-1996
and Meade concludes that this result is due to a strong influence of chairman Greenspan.1
Our analysis in chapter 2 not only provides the rationale for such behavior but also shows
that it can improve policy outcomes.
Meade and Sheets (forthcoming) and Gerlach-Kristen (2003a), among others, have
found that the members of the center are less likely to dissent. Gerlach-Kristen (2003a)
explains: "... Working at the Bank may provide them [the insiders] with more information
and opportunities for discussion about the economy and each others’ views, which might
lead them to vote as a block more frequently and dissent from the majority more rarely..."
1For more details on the FOMC decisions in the Greenspan years, see Chappell et al. (2005), chapter
8.
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(p. 100). This result illustrates our conclusions from chapter 3, where we show that
sharing information results in a more accurate estimate of the economic shocks, which
will rationally be followed by the sub-committee members in their voting.
Still, the studies cited above limit the analysis to the effects of group dynamics on
individually desired interest rates, and hence provide a partial illustration to the con-
clusions drawn in chapters 2 and 3. However, there is a recent and so far unique study
by Romer and Romer (2003) that provides a link between characteristics of individual
decision makers and the quality of monetary policy, measured in terms of macroeconomic
performance. The authors have concluded that macroeconomic policy outcomes are sig-
nificantly influenced by professional experience of the chairman of the FOMC. Inarguably,
more research following Romer and Romer (2003) is called for, in particular an extension
to analyzing the effects of the professional experience of all committee members on their
individual voting behavior as well as macroeconomic outcomes. Such research would allow
for direct testing of the theoretical results regarding the effects of committee members’
expertise and committee structure on individual voting behavior and collective decisions,
as presented in this volume.
Chapter 4 of this thesis already contains an empirical application of the results. Their
relevance is re-emphasized by the recent proposal to modify the operating framework
applied by the Bank of England (see Bank of England (2004a, 2004b)). The current
framework consists of standing facilities and operations in the reserve market carried out
up to four times a day, and does not include required reserves. Under the new arrangement
the frequency of open market operations will be reduced to once a week and commercial
banks will hold (voluntarily chosen) required reserves with the maintenance period of
roughly one month. The overall change nicely fits with the conclusions presented in the
thesis.
Further research could explore incentives of individual commercial banks to bid for
liquidity provided by central banks’ open market operations. A very recent study by Scalia
et al. (2005) is a first step in this direction. The authors employ a data set of individual
bids in the Eurosystem’s weekly repo auctions in order to test a number of theoretical
predictions, including those from reserve management models like the one presented in
chapter 4 of this thesis. Undoubtedly more research in this direction is desirable.
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift nemen wij de gevolgen van collectieve besluitvorm-
ing op het gedrag van monetaire-beleidsmakers onder de loep. Als besluiten groepsgewijs
worden genomen in plaats van door een enkele persoon, gaan zaken als de besluitvorm-
ingsprocedure en overlegprotocollen een rol spelen. Ze kunnen worden aangepast om de
verschillen tussen de beleidsmakers in visie op de economie, in kennis en vaardigheden zo
efficiënt mogelijk te benutten. In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoeken wij mogelijke verbeteringen
van de structuur van het monetaire beleidscomité (‘monetary policy committee’ - MPC),
waardoor deze inherente verschillen meer recht wordt gedaan.
De te volgen optimale procedure bij heterogeniteit van expertise binnen een comité
is volgens de juryliteratuur om de stem van ieder comitélid afzonderlijk naar individu-
ele expertise te wegen. In de praktijk, en in het bijzonder in MPC’s, worden stemmen
doorgaans echter niet gewogen naar expertise, maar worden besluiten op basis van een
eenvoudige meerderheid van stemmen genomen. In dergelijke gevallen worden dus sub-
optimale besluitvormingsprocedures gevolgd en is, dientengevolge, de accuratesse van het
aldus genomen collectieve besluit lager in vergelijking met de optimale uitkomst. Afhanke-
lijk van de mate van heterogeniteit van de comitéleden qua expertise en van de omvang
van het comité kan het verlies aan accuratesse oplopen tot 35,5%. Met andere woor-
den, door procedurele onvolkomenheden kan de waarschijnlijkheid dat het MPC de juiste
beslissing neemt afnemen met 35,5%.
Wij hebben aangetoond dat een juiste structurering van het comité inefficiënt gebruik
van de heterogene expertise van de comitéleden uitsluit, óók als besluiten genomen bli-
jven worden op basis van een eenvoudige meerderheid van stemmen. Wij deelden het
comité daartoe op in twee subgroepen, te weten één groep met minder en één met meer
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expertise, en lieten de laatstgenoemde groep voor de eigenlijke beleidsvergadering bi-
jeenkomen om een gezamenlijk standpunt ten aanzien van het te voeren monetaire beleid
te bepalen. Vervolgens kwamen de twee groepen bij elkaar om een stem uit te brengen
over het renteniveau. Door deze methode wordt niet alleen efficiënt gebruik gemaakt
van de beschikbare informatie, maar worden ook enkele aanbevelingen van Janis (1982)
opgevolgd waardoor een schadelijke op consensus gerichte groepsdynamiek, ‘groupthink ’
geheten, wordt vermeden.
De vorming van een subgroep van comitéleden met meer expertise komt de juistheid
van collectieve besluiten ten goede. Deze opzet werkt voornamelijk goed in een betrekke-
lijk klein comité, waar de inefficiëntie die optreedt bij besluitvorming volgens een een-
voudige meerderheid van stemmen word geëlimineerd. In grotere comités is bij deze opzet,
zij het in gereduceerde vorm, nog wél sprake van inefficiëntie, vooral als de expertise van
de comitéleden uiterst heterogeen is. Echter, door te bepalen dat de comitéleden met
meer expertise hun gemeenschappelijke standpunt bekendmaken vóór de stemming over
het renteniveau, zou het monetaire beleid ook in dat geval aan kwaliteit winnen en het
optimale resultaat benaderen. Dit komt doordat de bekendmaking een aanvullend, zeer
accuraat gemeenschappelijk signaal afgeeft aan de comitéleden met mindere expertise, die
daardoor de rationele keuze zullen maken zich naar dit signaal te voegen in plaats van af
te gaan op hun eigen, veel minder accurate informatie.
In hoofdstuk 3 gaan wij een stap verder in de beoordeling van de gevolgen van collec-
tieve besluitvorming voor de kwaliteit van het monetaire beleid. Hiertoe hebben wij een
model geformuleerd dat de effecten van de interactie alsook de uitwisseling van informatie
tussen de comitéleden beschrijft. Beide effecten worden als belangrijke kenmerken gezien
van overleg binnen MPC’s zoals dit in de praktijk geschiedt.
Wij hebben aangenomen dat MPC-leden weliswaar een visie op het economische model
delen, maar dat dit niet geldt voor de onafhankelijk geformuleerde visie op toekomstige
inflatieschokken. Als de besluitvormingsprocedure alleen voorziet in simultane stemming,
zou het comité uitkomen op het mediaanrenteniveau. Als de comitéleden hun visies kun-
nen delen en bundelen, zal dat hun expertise ten goede komen. Wij bestempelen dit proces
als ’leren’. Wij hebben aangetoond dat leren de accuratesse van collectieve besluiten ver-
hoogt, ook al leidt dit tot een positieve correlatie tussen de stemmen van de comitéleden.
De verbetering kan maximaal 50% bedragen.
99
Als alle comitéleden meedoen aan het delen van informatie en leren, moeten zij een
gemeenschappelijke raming van economische schokken opstellen. In de optimale situatie
zou een dergelijke raming mede gebaseerd dienen te zijn op een weging van de informatie
naar verschillende expertiseniveaus (zoals in het geval van een eenvoudige besluitvorm-
ingsprocedure die niet voorziet in interactie). Deze optimale procedure hoeft evenwel in
de praktijk niet te worden toegepast. In onze analyse laten wij zien dat met een vereen-
voudigde besluitvormingsprocedure zonder weging, waarbij bij voorbeeld de individuele
ramingen worden gemiddeld of de informatie-uitwisseling tot de comitéleden met meer
expertise beperkt blijft, eveneens de optimale uitkomst wordt benaderd.
Ten slotte vergelijken wij de netto voordelen van de in beide hoofdstukken belichte
besluitvormingsprocedures, waarbij wij de kosten van comitédeelname en de duur van een
vergadering hebben meegewogen. Als gevolg van communicatie tussen comitéleden wordt
de optimale comitéomvang beperkt, zelfs als de kosten minimaal zijn (géén communicatie
zou het Condorcet-resultaat opleveren: de optimale omvang van een comité zou oneindig
zijn). Dit komt doordat informatie-uitwisseling leidt tot verbetering van de individuele
vaardigheden, wat op haar beurt weer ten goede komt aan de collectieve accuratesse.
Zonder communicatie en de mogelijkheid om te leren kan de collectieve accuratesse alleen
worden verhoogd door toevoeging van extra comitéleden (wat weer extra kosten oplevert).
Naarmate de kosten verbonden aan het aantal leden en de met de bijeenkomsten gemoeide
tijd oplopen, worden communicatie en leerproces steeds belangrijker voor de accuratesse
van de collectieve besluiten: besluitvormingsprocedures die voorzien in leren leveren een
hogere collectieve accuratesse op dan elke ander procedure zonder leeraspect. In sommige
gevallen leveren zij bovendien ook nog kostenbesparingen op.
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift richten wij ons op de analyse van de institu-
tionele aspecten van de invoering van monetair beleid door centrale banken. Wij doen dat
vanuit de ‘nieuwe visie’ op de implementatie van monetair beleid (Bindseil (2005)), die er-
vanuit gaat dat een korte rente de juiste operationele doelstelling is en dat de permanente
faciliteiten, open-markttransacties en de verplichte reserves, nuttige instrumenten zijn bij
het sturen van de korte rente. Terwijl hierover in de afgelopen 10 á 15 jaar een aanzienlijke
mate van consensus is gegroeid, biedt deze benadering niettemin nog altijd aanzienlijke
ruimte voor eigen beleid ten aanzien van de mix van de te gebruiken instrumenten: het
niveau en de kenmerken van de reserveverplichtingen, het type en de frequentie van de
100 SAMENVATTING
open-markttransacties en de door de permanente faciliteiten bepaalde bandbreedte.
In hoofdstuk 4 tonen wij op basis van praktijkvoorbeelden uit het eurogebied en de
Verenigde Staten aan dat centrale banken vergelijkbare niveaus van rentestabilisatie kun-
nen bewerkstellingen bij gebruikmaking van sterk uiteenlopende operationele raamwerken.
Een belangrijke conclusie daaruit is dat een hogere frequentie van door centrale banken
uitgevoerde open-markttransacties niet automatisch tot stabielere rentetarieven leidt. An-
dere instrumenten spelen daarbij namelijk ook een belangrijke rol. Deze vaststelling was
voor ons aanleiding om een model voor de daggeldmarkt op te stellen waarbij de centrale
bank open-markttransacties verricht met als doel om afwijkingen van de daggeldrente van
het beoogde niveau tot een minimum te beperken. De commerciële banken moeten vol-
doen aan reserveverplichtingen en hebben daarom als doelstelling de alternatieve kosten
(‘opportunity costs’) van het aanhouden van de desbetreffende reserves gedurende de kas-
reserve aanhoudingsperiode alsook de boete voor onder- of overschrijding van de reserves
aan het eind van die periode tot een minimum te beperken.
Het model voorspelt dat, ongeacht de vormgeving van de verplichte reserves en de per-
manente faciliteiten, de daggeldrente bij een lagere frequentie van de open-markttransacties
gemiddeld meer afwijkt van het beoogde niveau. Deze uitkomst wordt bevestigd door de
data. De Federal Reserve verricht dagelijks open-markttransacties en de ECB wekelijks.
De Federal Funds rente wijkt op jaarbasis gemiddeld zelden significant af van nul, terwijl
de gemiddelde afwijking van de Eonia-rente altijd aanzienlijk afwijkt van nul.
Verder kunnen wij aantonen dat de volatiliteit van de daggeldrente negatief gerelateerd
is aan de frequentie van open-markttransacties. Dit zou betekenen dat de volatiliteit van
de daggeldrente zou toenemen bij een lagere frequentie van open-markttransacties. Het
model genereert echter een verhouding voor de berekening van de verplichte reserves die
benodigd zijn om een dergelijke bovenmatige volatiliteit uit te sluiten. Deze resultaten
worden ook bevestigd door de data. De gemiddelde twaalfmaands volatiliteit van de
daggeldrente in het eurogebied verschilt statistisch niet noodzakelijkerwijs van die in de
Verenigde Staten. De gemiddelde verhouding tussen autonome factoren en de reservev-
erplichtingen in het eurogebied in de periode 1999-2002 bedraagt 1.25 (1.4 volgens het
gekalibreerde model). Deze overeenkomst is verrassend. Wij komen tot de conclusie dat
deze uitkomst verklaart waarom het verschil in volatiliteit van de daggeldrente tussen de
twee monetaire regio’s statistisch insignificant is.
Streszczenie
(Summary in Polish)
W pierwszej cze˛´sci pracy (rozdziały 2 i 3) przeanalizowano wpływ zbiorowego charakteru
podejmowania decyzji na zachowanie podmiotów decyduja˛cych o polityce pienie˛z˙nej. W
sytuacjach kiedy decyzje sa˛ podejmowane przez grupe˛, a nie przez pojedyncza˛ osobe˛,
elementy procesu decyzyjnego takie jak reguły decyzyjne i protokoły dyskusji nabieraja˛
znaczenia i moga˛ by´c modyfikowane tak, aby róz˙nice w pogla˛dach, zasobach informa-
cyjnych czy poziomie ekspertyzy poszczególnych decydentów zostały jak najefektywniej
wykorzystane. W rozdziale drugim przedstawiono moz˙liwe ulepszenia w strukturze rady
polityki pienie˛z˙nej; takie, które kładłyby nalez˙yty nacisk na wymienione róz˙nice pomie˛dzy
decydentami.
W literaturze teoretycznej udowodniono, z˙e, je´sli członkowie rady róz˙nia˛ sie˛ poziomem
ekspertyzy, to optymalna reguła decyzyjna powinna uwzgle˛dnia´c waz˙enie głosów według
ekspertyzy. Jednakz˙e w praktyce - w szczególno´sci w radach podejmuja˛cych decyzje o
polityce pienie˛z˙nej - głosy członków nie sa˛ waz˙one. Decyzje sa˛ podejmowane zwykła˛
wie˛kszo´scia˛ głosów. Takie rozwia˛zanie prowadzi do nieefektywnego wykorzystania wiedzy
decydentów i do obniz˙enia trafno´sci decyzji grupowych w porównaniu do sytuacji op-
tymalnej. W zalez˙no´sci od stopnia róz˙norodno´sci ekspertyzy członków i wielko´sci rady,
obniz˙enie trafno´sci decyzji grupowych moz˙e doj´s´c do 35.5%. Zatem, w wyniku procedu-
ralnych niedocia˛gnie˛´c, prawdopodobien´stwo podje˛cia przez rade˛ prawidłowej decyzji moz˙e
spa´s´c nawet o 35.5%.
W rozdziale 2 pokazano, z˙e nadanie radzie odpowiedniej struktury moz˙e wyeliminowa´c
nieefektywne wykorzystanie niejednolitej ekspertyzy jej członków, przy jednoczesnym za-
chowaniu zwykłej wie˛kszo´sci głosów jako reguły decyzyjnej. Zaproponowano podzielenie
rady na dwie podgrupy według poziomu ekspertyzy, pozwolenie bardziej do´swiadczonej
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grupie zebra´c sie˛ przed posiedzeniem rady i uzgodni´c (w drodze głosowania) wspólna˛ pozy-
cje˛ dotycza˛ca˛ odpowiedniej stopy procentowej. Naste˛pnie obie podgrupy powinny razem
zagłosowa´c nad stopa˛ procentowa˛. Oprócz bardziej efektywnego wykorzystania doste˛p-
nej wiedzy, przedstawione rozwia˛zanie posiada dodatkowe zalety, gdyz˙ ła˛czy ono niektóre
charakterystyki przeciwdziałaja˛ce wysta˛pieniu zjawiska ‘groupthink ’, czyli przesadnego (a
zatem szkodliwego) da˛z˙enia do jednomy´slno´sci (Janis (1982)).
Utworzenie podgrupy złoz˙onej z bardziej do´swiadczonych decydentów zwie˛ksza trafno´s´c
grupowych decyzji. Taka dwupoziomowa struktura sprawdza sie˛ najlepiej w relatywnie
niewielkiej radzie, gdzie nieefektywno´s´c wynikaja˛ca ze stosowania zwykłej wie˛kszo´sci głosów
zostaje całkowicie wyeliminowana. W wie˛kszych radach nieefektywno´s´c jest zredukowana
ale niekoniecznie wyeliminowana, zwłaszcza je´sli poziom ekspertyzy członków jest bardzo
róz˙norodny. W takiej sytuacji zobowia˛zanie bardziej do´swiadczonej grupy do ujawnienia
ich wspólnej pozycji przed głosowaniem w radzie podnosi trafno´s´c grupowych decyzji do
tego stopnia, z˙e staje sie˛ ona zbliz˙ona do optymalnego rezultatu. Jest to wynikiem racjon-
alnej zmiany w zachowaniu mniej do´swiadczonych członków rady: ujawnienie wspólnej
decyzji przez do´swiadczona˛ grupe˛ decydentów stanowi bardzo wiarygodny sygnał doty-
cza˛cy odpowiedniej stopy procentowej. Mniej do´swiadczeni członkowie rady racjonalnie
wybiora˛ głosowanie w zgodzie z usłyszanym o´swiadczeniem niz˙ w zgodzie z własna˛, mniej
wiarygodna˛, informacja˛.
W rozdziale 3 postawiono kolejny krok w kierunku oceny wpływu zbiorowego podej-
mowania decyzji na jako´s´c polityki pienie˛z˙nej: sformułowano model obejmuja˛cy interakcje
i wymiane˛ informacji pomie˛dzy członkami rady. Oba efekty sa˛ uwaz˙ane za waz˙ne elementy
procesu podejmowania decyzji w istnieja˛cych radach polityki pienie˛z˙nej.
W analizie przyje˛to jako załoz˙enie, z˙e członkowie rady polityki pienie˛z˙nej zgadzaja˛ sie˛
co do modelu gospodarki ale maja˛ własne, indywidualnie sformułowane, pogla˛dy doty-
cza˛ce przyszłych szoków inflacyjnych. W rezultacie maja˛ oni odmienne pogla˛dy doty-
cza˛ce odpowiedniego nastawienia polityki pienie˛z˙nej, nawet je´sli maja˛ wspólny cel infla-
cyjny. Je´sli procedura podejmowania decyzji przewiduje równoczesne głosowanie, rada
przyjmie te˛ stope˛ procentowa˛, która jest mediana˛ wszystkich zgłaszanych propozycji.
Je´sli członkowie podziela˛ sie˛ swoja˛ wiedza˛, ich indywidualny poziom ekspertyzy powinien
wzrosna˛´c. W rozdziale trzecim nazwano ten proces ‘uczeniem sie˛’. Pokazano, z˙e ucze-
nie sie˛ zwie˛ksza trafno´s´c grupowych decyzji, pomimo tego, iz˙ wprowadza ono pozytywna˛
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korelacje˛ pomie˛dzy głosami decydentów. W punkcie maksymalnym, poprawa trafno´sci
decyzji wynosi nawet 50%.
Je´sli wszyscy członkowie rady biora˛ czynny udział w wymianie pogla˛dów i ucza˛ sie˛
od siebie nawzajem to powinni doj´s´c do wspólnej wizji dotycza˛cej przyszłych szoków
inflacyjnych. W sytuacji optymalnej, taka wspólna wizja powinna by´c sformułowana
jako waz˙ona s´rednia indywidualnych szacunków (tak jak w przypadku prostych reguł
decyzyjnych nie uwzgle˛dniaja˛cych wymiany informacji). Jednakz˙e i w tym przypadku
praktyka nie musi poda˛z˙a´c za teoria˛. W rozdziale trzecim pokazano, iz˙ zastosowanie
prostszych reguł decyzyjnych - nie wymagaja˛cych waz˙enia - takich jak obliczenie zwykłej
s´redniej z indywidualnych szacunków lub ograniczenie wymiany informacji do bardziej
do´swiadczonych członków rady, wystarcza do osia˛gnie˛cia wyników zbliz˙onych do optimum.
W ostatniej cze˛´sci rozdziału 3 dokonano porównania korzy´sci i kosztów róz˙nych pro-
cedur podejmowania decyzji, przedstawionych w obu rozdziałach, poprzez ustanowienie
kosztów zwia˛zanych z uczestnictwem w posiedzeniach rady i kosztów zwia˛zanych z czasem
spe˛dzonym na podejmowaniu decyzji. Je´sli procedura podejmowania decyzji przewiduje
wymiane˛ pogla˛dów pomie˛dzy członkami rady to optymalna wielko´s´c rady jest ograniczona,
nawet w sytuacji kiedy parametry kosztów sa˛ minimalne (przypomnijmy, z˙e bez komu-
nikacji optymalna wielko´s´c rady zmierzałaby do nieskon´czono´sci). Rezultat ten wynika
z korzystnego wpływu komunikacji na indiwidualny poziom ekspertyzy członków rady,
a zatem i na trafno´s´c grupowych decyzji. Bez komunikacji umoz˙liwiaja˛cej uczenie sie˛
pomie˛dzy decydentami, trafno´s´c grupowych decyzji moz˙e by´c podniesiona tylko poprzez
zwie˛kszenie liczebno´sci rady (co pocia˛ga za soba˛ dodatkowe koszty). W miare˛ wzrostu
kosztów uczestnictwa w posiedzeniach rady i kosztów czasu, znaczenie wymiany informa-
cji i uczenia sie˛ dla trafno´sci decyzji rady ro´snie: procedury decyzyjne obejmuja˛ce uczenie
sie˛ daja˛ znacznie wyz˙sza˛ jako´s´c grupowych decyzji niz˙ procedury wykluczaja˛ce uczenie
sie˛. W niektórych przypadkach obserwuje sie˛ równiez˙ redukcje˛ kosztów.
W drugiej cze˛´sci pracy (rozdział 4) przeprowadzono analize˛ instytucjonalnych aspek-
tów wdraz˙ania polityki pienie˛z˙nej przez banki centralne. Przyje˛to przy tym ‘nowa˛ wizje˛’
wdraz˙ania polityki pienie˛z˙nej (Bindseil (2005)), zakładaja˛c, z˙e odpowiednim celem op-
eracyjnym polityki pienie˛z˙nej jest kontrola krótkoterminowej stopy procentowej, przy
wykorzystaniu instrumentów rynkowych: operacji depozytowo-kredytowych, operacji ot-
wartego rynku i rezerwy obowia˛zkowej. Takie podej´scie stało sie˛ standardem w praktyce
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ostatnich 10-15 lat. Niemniej pozostawia ono bankom centralnym duz˙e pole manewru w
zakresie szczegółowych rozwia˛zan´: poziomu i charakteru rezerwy obowia˛zkowej, rodzaju
i cze˛stotliwo´sci operacji otwartego rynku, oraz szeroko´sci korytarza stóp procentowych
wyznaczonego przez operacje depozytowo-kredytowe.
W rozdziale 4 pokazano, na podstawie realnych przykładów strefy Euro i USA, z˙e banki
centralne sa˛ w stanie osia˛gna˛´c porównywalny poziom stabilizacji krótkoterminowych stóp
procentowych przy zastosowaniu zasadniczo odmiennych ram operacyjnych. Z porów-
nania tego nalez˙y wycia˛gna˛´c jeden waz˙ny wniosek: wie˛ksza cze˛stotliwo´s´c operacji ot-
wartego rynku niekoniecznie oznacza zwie˛kszona˛ stabilno´s´c krótkoterminowych stóp pro-
centowych. Inne instrumenty polityki pienie˛z˙nej odgrywaja˛ nie mniej znacza˛ca˛ role˛. Ta
obserwacja pozwoliła na zbudowanie modelu rynku funduszy typu overnight, na którym
bank centralny przeprowadza operacje otwartego rynku w celu minimalizowania odchylen´
stopy procentowej typu overnight od warto´sci poz˙a˛danej przez bank centralny (tj. od celu
operacyjnego banku centralnego). Banki komercyjne sa˛ zobowia˛zane do utrzymywanie
rezerwy obowia˛zkowej, w zwia˛zku z czym ich celem jest minimalizowanie kosztów utra-
conego oprocentowania zwia˛zanych z utrzymywaniem s´rodków na rachunkach w banku
centralnym oraz kosztów zwia˛zanych z brakiem lub nadmiarem rezerw w ostatnim dniu
okresu utrzymywania rezerw obowia˛zkowych.
Model przewiduje, z˙e niezalez˙nie od charakteru rezerwy obowia˛zkowej i operacji depozy-
towo-kredytowych, s´rednie odchylenie stopy procentowej typu overnight od warto´sci wyz-
naczonej przez bank centralny jest wie˛ksze je´sli cze˛stotliwo´s´c operacji otwartego rynku jest
mniejsza. Wyniki te daja˛ sie˛ potwierdzi´c empirycznie. Rezerwa Federalna przeprowadza
operacje otwartego rynku codziennie podczas gdy Europejski Bank Centralny — tylko raz
na tydzien´: roczna s´rednia odchylen´ stopy Federal Funds od warto´sci wyznaczanej przez
Rezerwe˛ Federalna˛ prawie nigdy nie jest statystycznie róz˙na od zera, podczas gdy s´rednia
odchylen´ stopy Eonia jest zawsze statystycznie róz˙na od zera.
Według modelu, zmienno´s´c stopy procentowej typu overnight jest, ceteris paribus,
odwrotnie skorelowana z cze˛stotliwo´scia˛ operacji otwartego rynku, tzn. z˙e zmniejszenie
cze˛stotliwo´sci przeprowadzanych operacji moz˙e doprowadzi´c do wysta˛pienia nadmiernej
zmienno´sci stopy procentowej. Jednakz˙e model pozwala na wyprowadzanie formuły do
obliczenia takiego poziomu rezerwy obowia˛zkowej, który eliminowałby nadmierna˛ zmien-
no´s´c stóp procentowych. Wnioski te równiez˙ znajduja˛ potwierdzenie w praktyce: s´rednia
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roczna zmienno´s´c stopy procentowej typu overnight w strefie Euro nie zawsze róz˙ni sie˛
statystycznie od s´redniej rocznej obliczonej dla USA. S´rednia ze stosunku rezerwy obow-
ia˛zkowej i czynników autonomicznych w strefie Euro, obliczona dla lat 1999-2002, wynosi
1.25, podczas gdy skalibrowany stosunek wynikaja˛cy z modelu wynosi 1.4. Podobien´stwo
warto´sci sugeruje, iz˙ brak statystycznie istotnej róz˙nicy w zmienno´sci stóp procentowych
typu overnight pomie˛dzy USA i strefa˛ Euro wynika z zastosowania odpowiedniego poziomu
rezerwy obowia˛zkowej w strefie Euro.
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